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INTRODUCTION
One of the more intriguing developments in recent admin-
istrative law scholarship has been a changed attitude toward
the role of judicial review in controlling administrative action.
A generation ago, scholars could assume without much soul-
searching that judicial review was fundamental to the sound
governance of the regulatory system.1 Today, some of the most
respected commentators in the field offer pointed and often bit-
ing criticisms of the courts' place in the administrative process.2
Naturally, this new intellectual climate has affected the time-
less debate over the proper intensity of judicial review.3 Shar-
ing the stage, however, are increasingly prevalent questions
about whether the judiciary should review certain agency ac-
tions, or at least some of the determinations that underlie
them.
In part, the debate over reviewability focuses on statutes
that directly prohibit courts from examining some or all aspects
of certain agency conduct: this debate looks at the proper
ground rules for interpreting preclusion statutes4 and also at
1. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
320-94 (1965) (outlining the presumptive right to judicial review of agency
actions).
2. See, e.g., Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 292-99 (1987) (arguing that "hard
look" judicial review has sabotaged rulemaking by the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration); McGarity, Judicial Review of Scientific Rulemak-
ing, 9 ScI., TECH. & HuM. VALUES 97, 97-103 (1984) (suggesting that personal
opinions about the value of an agency's goals guide judges in reviewing agency
actions); Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on
the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemak-
ing, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303-13 (arguing that intrusive appellate court review
has led to a decrease in agency rulemaking); Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLM. L. REV. 1093, 1135-36 (1987) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court encourages lower courts to defer to agencies'
statutory interpretations because it fears that judicial lawmaking tends to dis-
rupt complex regulatory schemes).
3. In addition to the sources cited supra note 2, see, e.g., Garland, Deregu-
lation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 525-61 (1985) (documenting
the rise of modern "hard look" review); Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight
of Administrative Law, 1985 DuKE L.J. 427 (criticizing intrusive judicial re-
view of agency procedures and decisions); Symposium, 1986 DUKE L.J. 217 (ar-
ticles responding to Smith's essay).
4. See generally O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review
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whether new ones should be enacted.5 On another level, the
debate focuses on actions that are, in the language of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA),6 "committed to agency dis-
cretion by law."' 7 This somewhat awkward phrase refers to
actions that are exempt from review because of judicial self-re-
straint rather than because of perceived congressional
command.
This Article deals with the "committed to agency discre-
tion" category of unreviewable administrative action. The cate-
gory always has been considered quite small; some theorists
have refused to acknowledge that it even exists in a meaningful
sense.8 Nevertheless, the "committed to agency discretion"
clause of the APA, section 701(a)(2), has shown surprising life
during the past several years. In Heckler v. Chaney,9 the
Supreme Court relied squarely on that clause to hold that
agency refusals to initiate proceedings are presumptively unre-
viewable.10 In ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers'"
(BLE), the Court invoked the clause as partial support for
holding that an agency's denial of a petition for reconsideration
is unreviewable when the petition is predicated on an asserted
material error in the original decision.12 The Court's reliance
on this APA clause was striking, because none of the parties
in England and the United States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 644-58 (1986)
(comparing judicial responses in the United States and Great Britain to legisla-
tive acts precluding judicial review of certain agency decisions); infra notes
246-252 (discussing Supreme Court's development of a "common law of
preclusion").
5. In 1988, after decades of controversy, Congress for the first time au-
thorized judicial review of veterans' benefits decisions, but continued to pro-
hibit the courts from hearing challenges to factual and law-applying
determinations of the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Veterans' Judicial Re-
view Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, §§ 101-403, 102 Stat. 4105, 4105-22 (1988) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); see Note, New Veterans Legislation
Opens the Door to Judicial Review... Slowly!, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 889, 897-904
(1989) (discussing development and probable impact of the Act); see also Rains,
A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 15-30 (1987) (discussing bills that would limit judicial re-
view of Social Security disability claims); Verkuil, Congressional Limitations
on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TUL. L. REV. 733, 753-64, 771-75 (1983) (analyz-
ing extent to which statutes should limit judicial review of rules during en-
forcement proceedings).
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1988).
7. Id. § 701(a)(2).
8. See, e.g., infra notes 43-47, 52-53 and accompanying text.
9. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
10. Id at 832-33.
11. 482 U.S. 270 (1987) (BLE).
12. Id. at 282.
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had mentioned it, nor particularly dwelt on the reviewability is-
sue at all. Finally, in Webster v. Doe,'3 the Court held under
section 701(a)(2) that a dismissed employee of the Central In-
telligence Agency could not challenge his termination in the
federal courts, except on constitutional grounds.
The Court's revival of section 701(a)(2) makes scholarly
analysis of its scope a pressing priority, because existing under-
standings of its meaning are surprisingly underdeveloped.
Since 1971 the primary guideline used to determine whether an
agency action is "committed to agency discretion" has been
whether there is "law to apply" to the administrative decision.
The Court has cited this test as authoritative as recently as the
1989-90 Term.14 Yet the test, first announced in Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe,15 is simplistic, historically un-
founded, and needlessly rigid in its implications. It ignores so
many of the considerations that undoubtedly should influence
decisions about unreviewability that the lower courts have tor-
tured and evaded the formula in as many ways as they can con-
trive. In any event, Czaney and Doe display considerable
ambivalence regarding the utility of the test,16 and BLE disre-
gards it entirely.' 7
The "law to apply" formula, then, may be on the verge of
losing its influence; but if it passes from the administrative law
scene, what will replace it? This Article suggests a clearer way
of framing the issues posed by the "committed to agency discre-
tion" doctrine. The key lies in a new solution to what might be
called the Supreme Court's "judicial restraint dilemma." On
the one hand, the Court is committed to preventing excessive
judicial intervention in executive branch activities; on the other
it prefers to shun the exercise of federal common law-making
power. These priorities come into conflict in the un-
reviewability context. The Court has pretended that the re-
sponsibility for curtailing excessive judicial review lies with
Congress - a premise that is becoming progressively harder to
sustain. The only way the Court will be able to tame the un-
ruly law of unreviewability is to become less timid about utiliz-
ing its common law powers toward that end.
This Article's purpose is not to urge that more agency ac-
13. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
14. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 1860 n.22
(1989) (dictum).
15. 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
16. See infra notes 129-43 (Chaney), 200-17 (Doe) and accompanying text.
17. See BLE, 482 U.S. at 282.
[Vol. 74:689
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tions should be placed beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny.
An era of expanded unreviewability seems, nevertheless, to lie
ahead, and the Article does aim to equip the judiciary with
meaningful categories of analysis. Part I introduces the princi-
pal concepts used in discussions of unreviewability in adminis-
trative law. Part II then surveys the four principal Supreme
Court opinions that have explored the unreviewability doctrine.
A pervasive theme of this part is that the Court has overem-
phasized the notion that an agency action is unreviewable when
the courts are unable to engage in meaningful judicial review.
Part II claims that judicial review is virtually always feasible,
and that the real question is thus one of desirability. Part III
presents this claim more formally, asserting that courts should
overtly weigh pragmatic considerations when deciding whether,
and to what extent, a given type of agency action should be
deemed unreviewable. A pragmatic approach would bring
needed flexibility to the "committed to agency discretion" doc-
trine. For example, it would provide a basis for courts to hold,
in some circumstances, that they will review an agency's legal
conclusions while refraining from reviewing its factual and dis-
cretionary conclusions.
A major objection that might be raised against this prag-
matic approach is that it might lead to unpredictable results, or
to unprincipled and frequent rejection of unreviewability
claims by courts seeking to maximize their own power. Part IV
tests this possibility by examining Chaney's progeny in the
lower courts. This review indicates that courts have appropri-
ately weighed practical arguments when they have had to apply
Chaney to situations not precisely addressed in the Supreme
Court's opinion. In light of this experience, the Article con-
cludes that the pragmatic approach to unreviewability has con-
siderable promise and should be taken more seriously in the
future.
I. THE PROBLEM OF UNREVIEWABILITY
The APA's judicial review chapter18 provides that agency
action is normally subject to review,19 but also states in section
701(a) that the chapter "does not apply to the extent that (1)
statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law."'20 The first of the two
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1988).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1988).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988).
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numbered clauses does not create interpretation difficulties
(although there may be uncertainty as to whether a given stat-
ute actually precludes review). The cryptic language of the sec-
ond clause, however, has generated tremendous confusion.21
The most fundamental point in controversy has been
whether this "committed to agency discretion" clause renders
any administrative action unreviewable. As used in this Arti-
cle, the term "unreviewability" refers to a situation in which
the courts deliberately refrain from reviewing an agency action,
or at least some of the findings and conclusions underlying it.22
An agency's action is totally unreviewable if all of its premises
escape the court's examination; it is partially unreviewable if
only some of them do.23 Thus, unreviewability is a threshold
defense, like standing or ripeness. When the government
prevails on this defense, a particular administrative action or
finding receives no scrutiny - not even deferential scrutiny -
on judicial review. Section 701(a)(1) obviously recognizes un-
reviewability in this sense, but whether section 701(a)(2) does
has been hotly disputed. Raoul Berger crystallized the issue in
a famous 1965 article.24 He maintained that Congress had in-
tended in the APA to subject every administrative action to ju-
dicial review for abuse of discretion.2s His claim gave rise to
21. As recently as 1986, Professor Davis commented: "I don't see how
anybody can find the meaning of those words. The words seem to contradict
themselves; they don't make any sense; if they do, what might the sense be?"
Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 AinIN. L. REV.
511, 519 (1986) (panel discussion) (remarks of K.C. Davis) [hereinafter Present
at the Creation].
22. Professor Koch uses the term "unbridled discretion" to denote the
same concept. See Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 469, 495-502 (1986). Koch also envisions a second category
of unreviewable action, "numinous discretion," consisting of actions that a
court could not possibly review. Id. at 502-03. As subsequent discussion will
make clear, however, I believe that no administrative actions fall into this lat-
ter category. For example, Koch contends that the FDA was exercising numi-
nous discretion in its famous ruling that the minimum peanut content of
peanut butter should be set at 90% rather than 87%, because "the range of
equally correct answers was very broad." Id. at 505. In my view, however,
there is no reason to call the FDA's ruling unreviewable; rather, one should
say that it was an easy case on the merits. Indeed, as Koch acknowledges,
some exercises of the FDA's authority might well have violated the agency's
mandate (e.g., if the FDA had set the level at 99.99%). To try to distinguish
between a 90% case and a 99.99% case on the basis of "reviewability" would be
awkward to say the least.
23. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
24. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 55 (1965).
25. Id. at 57-58.
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what is probably the longest - and possibly the most vitriolic
- debate in the history of law reviews, with Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis challenging the thesis in a series of four articles and
Berger replying in four more.2 6
A look at the language and legislative history of section
701(a)(2) helps one understand why there was uncertainty on
this point. In the first place, a straightforward reading of the
text of section 701(a)(2) would be totally unacceptable. At face
value, the clause seems to say that every enabling statute that
grants some discretion to an agency creates a sphere of admin-
istrative conduct that the courts must not examine. That con-
clusion, however, would be absurd: everyday reality teaches
that judicial review of agencies' exercises of discretionary judg-
ment is routine.2 Indeed, the APA contains compelling inter-
nal evidence that the literal interpretation was not intended.
Section 706(2)(A) provides that an agency action may be set
aside for "abuse of discretion."z If the existence of statutory
discretion made the challenged action unreviewable, that provi-
sion would become meaningless.2 9 Accordingly, the need for a
restrictive, and perhaps artificial, reading of the phrase "com-
mitted to agency discretion" has been universally acknowl-
edged since the earliest days of the APA.30
The legislative drafters of section 701(a)(2) realized that
this clause was obscure. Indeed, the evolution of this section
has been recognized from the beginning31 as exemplifying a fa-
miliar form of congressional evasion. Early in the drafting pro-
cess, the legislative players agreed on textual language that
they must have known was ambiguous. Then, as questions
about the meaning of this language surfaced, each side at-
tempted to slant the legislative history in its favor, instead of
going to the trouble of revising the text itself.32 The Attorney
26. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J.
965, 966 n.9 (1969) (citing eight previous installments).
27. See generally Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated. An Adminis-
trative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 250-60 (1986) (summarizing
current law on abuse of discretion review).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
29. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 374-75; Berger, supra note 24, at 60.
30. E.g., Dickinson, The Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (Section 10): Background and Effect, in THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINsTRATIvE AGENcIES 546, 567
(G. Warren ed. 1947).
31. See Conard, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458, 461 & n.13
(1947).
32. The history of subsequent administrative procedure legislation con-
talus other well documented examples of precisely the same congressional tac-
1990]
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General, representing the executive branch, explained section
701(a)(2) as embodying a straightforward notion of un-
reviewability - i.e., as restating the prior law, under which
courts simply would refrain from examining certain "unreview-
able" issues.3 3
The House and Senate sponsors of the Act, however, dis-
puted this interpretation. They evidently felt a need to reas-
sure colleagues who were worried that the clause would be
read literally - i.e., as prohibiting judicial review whenever an
agency possessed some discretion. Thus, the legislative spon-
sors filled their reports and floor colloquies with assurances
that the APA would still permit courts to consider whether an
agency had abused its discretion.34 Consistently with that posi-
tion, the sponsors found themselves denying that section
701(a)(2) had any operative effect at all. By their account, the
clause merely stated the truism that, when an agency has been
granted broad discretionary powers, its actions are likely to be
lawful and therefore immune from judicial reversal. As the
Senate committee report stated: "If, for example, statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law
to apply, courts of course have no statutory question to re-
view."35 In a similar vein, the House committee report re-
marked: "In any case the existence of discretion does not
tic. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (describing
legislative history of Freedom of Information Act); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 5:3, at 312-13 (2d ed. 1978) (same); Levin, Review of "Ju-
risdictional" Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DUKE L.J. 355, 370-
85 (describing legislative history of proposed Regulatory Reform Act of 1982).
For more general descriptions of manipulation of legislative history, see, e.g.,
Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the Planned Colloquy and its Effect in the
Interpretation of Statutes, 45 A.B.A. J. 1314, 1314-16 (1959); Strauss, Legisla-
tive Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 427, 436 (1989).
33. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPENDIX TO ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S STATEMENT REGARDING REVISED COMMITTEE PRINT OF OCTOBER 5,
1945, S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44 (1945) [hereinafter S. REP.]
(stating, as an example, that the NLRB's refusal to issue a complaint is unre-
viewable), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
229-30 (1946) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
34. E.g., 92 CONG. REC. 2153-54 (1946) (remarks of Senators Donnell, Aus-
tin, and McCarran), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 310-
11. Although obviously staged, these colloquies do show what interpretation
the floor manager, Senator McCarran, wished to place on the public record.
35. S. REP., supra note 33, at 26, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 33, at 212. For discussion of the Supreme Court's highly inventive inter-
pretation of the sentence quoted in text, see infra Part II. B.
[Vol. 74:689
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prevent a person from bringing a review action but merely pre-
vents him pro tanto from prevailing therein."36
On the surface, this history may seem to leave little doubt
that the intent behind the APA - in the sense in which courts
understand legislative "intent" - was to renounce the concept
of unreviewability (except where review is precluded by stat-
ute). The House and Senate committees clearly took that posi-
tion; and under conventional statutory interpretation lore,
committee reports are far and away the most reliable type of
legislative history material.3 7 In this situation, however, there
are reasons to go beyond the traditional respect for committee
reports. This Article will not rehash the many doubts now be-
ing voiced in court cases and law reviews concerning the relia-
bility of legislative history as a general matter. For, regardless
of one's attitude towards committee reports in general, there
are especially strong grounds for discounting them in this
context.38
In the first place, the committee reports are somewhat at
odds with the text of section 701(a)(2). As enacted in 1946,
before being revised for incorporation into the United States
Code, the section provided that agency action was judicially re-
viewable "[e]xcept so far as ... agency action is committed by
law to agency discretion." 39 Although not wholly clear, this
language at least indicates that section 701(a)(2) was designed
to create an "exception" to the judicial review principles that
the APA prescribes elsewhere. The same argument can be
made about the current language of section 701(a)(2), which ap-
36. H. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 275; see also S. REP., supra note 33, at 26 (stat-
ing that the § 701(a)(2) exception "would apply even if not stated at the
outset"), reprinted in LEGISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 212.
37. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 & n.3 (1984) (collect-
ing cases declaring that committee reports are especially authoritative); Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (stating as a self-evident proposition that although the "Attorney Gen-
eral's gloss on [§ 701(a)(2) of] the APA is entitled to some deference," it "is not
entitled to particular deference . . . to the extent that it is inconsistent with
the Senate Committee Report").
38. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 946-47 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Starr, Observations on the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 371, 373-79 (arguing that benefits of using legislative history as an inter-
pretive tool are outweighed by abuses); Strauss, supra note 32, at 436-38. But
see Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423,
437-52 (1988) (criticizing the critics).
39. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237, 243
(1946).
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pears to refer to circumstances in which the usual judicial re-
view guarantees of the APA do not "apply." Moreover, this
"exception" interpretation maintains the parallelism of the two
clauses of section 701(a): obviously the purpose of clause (1) is
to exempt certain agency actions from judicial review, and the
structure of the statute invites the inference that clause (2)
does the same.
Second, if members of Congress really believed that section
701(a)(2) had no effect, one must ask why they did not simply
delete the clause. A maxim of statutory construction declares
that a statute should, if possible, be construed so that none of
its provisions will be superfluous.40 The maxim cannot be con-
sidered absolute, of course, because superfluous provisions
sometimes result from sheer carelessness of legislative drafters.
Oversight, however, cannot account for section 701(a)(2), a
clause that received sustained attention from legislators. The
inescapable conclusion is that the sponsors left section 701(a)(2)
in the APA because some members of Congress believed it was
important. More specifically, the clause must have survived be-
cause the Act's sponsors did not want to risk alienating the Ad-
ministration and its supporters in Congress. 41
Seen in this light, the legislative history of section 701(a)(2)
is much more balanced than initial inspection might suggest.
The interpretation offered in the committee reports may not
disclose much more about the legislature's "intent" than the
Attorney General's interpretation does.42 Ultimately, this
40. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825,
837 & n.11 (1988) (collecting cases).
41. As knowledgeable observers have reported, the unanimous vote by
which Congress enacted the APA was largely attributable to the Attorney
General's endorsement of the measure. See Present at the Creation, supra
note 21, at 514-15 (remarks of Walter Gellhorn); Vanderbilt, Legislative Back-
ground of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in THE FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINsTRATIvE AGENCIES 12-13 (G.
Warren ed. 1947).
42. The Supreme Court has obliquely endorsed this conclusion in other
contexts. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (stating that Attorney
General's interpretation of the APA is entitled to "some deference ... because
of the role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the legislation").
Strictly speaking, the Court's comment in Vermont Yankee referred to the ex-
planatory manual that the Attorney General published soon after the passage
of the Act. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter
ATT'Y GEN. MANUAL]. It would be difficult to argue, however, that the Attor-
ney General's pre-enactment interpretation is less reliable than his post-enact-
ment interpretation; the usual assumption is precisely to the contrary. See
[Vol. 74:689
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means that a fair reading of the APA and its legislative history
does not really indicate whether section 701(a)(2) preserves a
realm of true unreviewability. At least by default, Congress
left resolution of the question to the courts and commentators.
Given these circumstances, the legislative history support
for the notion that section 701(a)(2) was meaningless was
strong enough to give plausibility to Raoul Berger's defense of
that notion two decades later.43 Specifically, Berger read sec-
tion 701(a)(2) as merely declaring that courts should respect le-
gitimate exercises of agency discretion. Under his construction,
the clause would not even come into play until a court had as-
certained that the agency had not abused its discretion.44 Of
course, Berger's view was still vulnerable to the surplusage ob-
jection. Because unabused discretion would pass muster under
the section 706 scope-of-review criteria,45 such discretion would
survive judicial review in any event; so what was the point of
section 701(a)(2)? 46 Nevertheless, Berger's article was a mas-
terpiece of rhetoric; it seized and held the moral high ground
with colorful warnings about the dangers of unchecked admin-
istrative power.4 7 In contrast, his antagonist Professor Davis
argued for an interpretation like the Attorney General's - sec-
tion 701(a)(2) recognized a realm in which certain administra-
tive determinations would be genuinely unreviewable. 48
It is unnecessary to dwell on the details of their arguments
here, because the Supreme Court has since rewritten the law of
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13
(1980) (stating that post-enactment legislative history normally is mistrusted).
This comparison need not be pursued here, however, because the manual's in-
terpretation of § 701(a)(2) did not differ significantly from the interpretation
in the Attorney General's pre-enactment correspondence with Congress. Com-
pare supra note 33 and accompanying text with ATr'Y GEN. MANUAL, supra, at
94-95.
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
44. See Berger, supra note 24, at 63. He articulated this construction more
clearly in later articles. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 26, at 968-71.
45. Section 706 lists various grounds that courts may use in overturning
agency action, such as abuse of discretion, excess of authority, and procedural
error. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). Thus, the court's task during judicial review is to
measure a given agency action against the § 706 criteria, except to the extent
that § 701 exempts the action from such scrutiny.
46. See Rogers, A Fresh Look At Agency "Discretion, " 57 TUL. L. REV. 776,
787-88 (1983) (arguing that "if the 'committed to agency discretion' exception
applies, by definition, only to proper exercises of discretion, it would serve lit-
tle purpose. Proper choices would be upheld anyway.").
47. See Berger, supra note 24, at 55-57, 88-95.
48. E.g., Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable,
51 MINN. L. REV. 643, 643 (1967).
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unreviewability in ways that neither Berger nor Davis (let
alone the framers of the APA) could have foreseen. What is of
interest today is the outcome of the debate. Technically, Da-
vis's side of the argument clearly has prevailed. Recent
Supreme Court cases 49 have confirmed (if any doubt remained)
that the "committed to agency discretion" clause does refer to
certain administrative actions that are genuinely unreviewable
because of judicial self-restraint.50
Nevertheless, Berger has achieved something of a moral
victory. Because the legal system's distaste for unchecked ad-
ministrative power remains strong, the Berger view that section
701(a)(2) is inconsequential still appeals to some scholars.5 1 For
example, one can detect echoes of Berger's position in the writ-
ings of Professor Cass Sunstein, who comes close to assuming
that a court must explore every possible theory by which a
given agency action could be set aside before it may label the
action unreviewable. 52 Of course, as Sunstein seems to ac-
knowledge, this assumption deprives section 701(a)(2) of any
practical significance.53 More importantly, the courts still dis-
49. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
50. Read literally, the phrase "by law" in § 701(a)(2) is broad enough to
encompass statutes that directly preclude judicial review, and it is sometimes
construed that way. E.g., J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
THE AMERICAN PuBuc LAw SYSTEM 698-701 (2d ed. 1985); Davis, supra note
48, at 652 n.30. One problem with that construction, however, is that it makes
§ 701(a)(1) completely superfluous. The Supreme Court has admonished that
the two clauses should, if possible, be read so as to give effect to each. Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-30 (1985). Furthermore, a reading of § 701(a)(2)
that excludes preclusion statutes contributes to analytic clarity. Frequently,
the government asks a court to refrain from review of a particular action be-
cause of a preclusion statute, or, in the alternative, as a matter of judicial self-
restraint. It is convenient to discuss these two contentions, each of which im-
plicates a separate line of cases, as arising under § 701(a)(1) and § 701(a)(2),
respectively.
51. See, e.g., B. ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.10 (2d ed. 1984)
(§ 701(a)(2) adds "little or nothing" to exemption from review in § 701(a)(1)).
52. See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52
U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 659-60 (1985). Sunstein's analysis rests heavily on the
widely accepted doctrine that an action always is reviewable if there is "law to
apply" to the administrative action. He does not, however, limit his support
for judicial review to the boundaries inherent in that test. On the contrary, he
goes on to suggest that an unreviewability defense should not prevent a court
from deciding whether the plaintiff has made an "especially powerful" show-
ing that the agency is guilty of "generalized arbitrariness." Id at 682-83. A
logical application of the unreviewability concept would compel a court to ter-
minate its inquiry without deciding whether the plaintiff's case on the merits
is strong or weak.
53. See id at 659. Although Sunstein makes some suggestions about how
to choose between calling a decision "unreviewable" and calling it "lawful," id.
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play a lingering attachment to the Berger viewpoint. They
have construed section 701(a)(2) quite narrowly; and even when
they have invoked it, they often have felt compelled to pay lip
service to the idea that unreviewability occurs only when courts
are unable to provide review. In other words, courts are reluc-
tant to acknowledge the possibility that they might deliberately
refuse to resolve challenges they could entertain. Subsequent
parts of this Article will examine in detail how this reluctance
has influenced the courts' substantive gloss on section 701(a) (2).
Before reaching these substantive issues, however, we must
consider briefly the important "to the extent that" language in
section 701(a). This prefatory phrase establishes that an action
can be partially rather than totally unreviewable.54 The notion
of partial unreviewability becomes clearer when one realizes
that, in order to take any valid action, the agency must make a
series of determinations. Depending on what issues the parties
choose to raise, the agency may have to decide, for example,
whether the proposed action is constitutional, whether it is
within the agency's statutory jurisdiction, what criteria Con-
gress expected the agency to utilize in making the decision,
what the facts are, or whether the agency made a plausible ar-
gument that those facts support agency action to fulfill the con-
gressional mandate. Ordinarily, each of these determinations is
subject to judicial review (although some determinations are
reviewed more searchingly than others). To say that an action
is partially unreviewable simply means that courts will ex-
amine some of these determinations but will not examine
others.
This theoretical refinement, although sometimes over-
looked,55 is a crucial one, because partial unreviewability is
much more common than total unreviewability. Courts rarely
pronounce an action "unreviewable" without adding that they
would, nevertheless, entertain a challenge under limited cir-
cumstances - for example, if the action were alleged to be
at 659 n.37, his discussion implies that this choice is purely a matter of diction,
not substance. See also Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421, 477-78 (1987) (arguing that, because § 701(a)(2) is superflu-
ous, it should be repealed).
54. E.g., ArT'Y GEN. MANuAL, supra note 42, at 95; 5 K. DAVIS, supra note
32, § 28:5, at 271.
55. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Attorney Gen.,
804 F.2d 1256, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated, 808 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en
banc), district court aff'd by equally divided ct., 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(en banc).
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unconstitutional. 56
II. UNREVIEWABILITY IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. BACKGROUND
Although courts have not enjoyed much success in defining
which administrative actions to treat as unreviewable, one
premise about the substantive scope of section 701(a)(2) is un-
controversial: the clause applies to only a small fraction of all
agency actions. The Supreme Court formally endorsed this
premise in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,57 by establishing a
presumption in favor of judicial review.58 Under Abbott Labo-
ratories, therefore, courts should rarely invoke the two preclu-
sion provisions in section 701(a), and should do so only
reluctantly. The case is a symbol of society's deeply ingrained
commitment to the availability of judicial review as a check on
administrative action.
Despite its importance, however, the presumption favoring
judicial review of administrative action is just a presumption.59
By itself, Abbott Laboratories neither resolves individual cases
nor provides a mode of analysis to guide courts in deciding
whether a given agency action is unreviewable. Indeed, until
1971, when the Supreme Court began to play an active role in
elaborating the theoretical underpinnings of section 701(a)(2),
administrative law did not seem to have any identifiable theory
as to the kinds of agency actions that were "committed to
agency discretion." Of course, certain subject areas had been
regarded as among the best candidates for unreviewability -
for example, military and foreign affairs, and the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.60 Nevertheless, the identification of
56. E.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601-05 (1988) (refusing to hold that
§ 102(c) of the National Security Act precluded judicial review of constitu-
tional claims); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Woodsmall
v. Lyng, 816 F.2d 1241, 1246 (8th Cir. 1987); Dina v. Attorney Gen. of United
States, 793 F.2d 473, 476-77 (2d Cir. 1986).
57. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
58. Id at 139-41. As originally formulated in Abbott Laboratories, the pre-
sumption was said to be subject to the limitations in § 701 of the APA. 387 U.S.
at 140. However, the case is regularly read as meaning that the presumption
should guide the interpretation of the preclusion provisions themselves. See,
e.g., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS
§ 5.3, at 135 (1985).
59. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (finding
statutory preclusion).
60. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (ist
ed. Supp. 1970) (surveying and critiquing pre-1971 case law).
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particular situations in which section 701(a)(2) came into play
was essentially ad hoc.
At best, the lower courts tried to achieve a coherent under-
standing of section 701(a)(2) through a balancing test that
called for weighing policy reasons for and against judicial re-
view. The First Circuit followed this balancing approach in the
well-known case of Hahn v. Gottlieb.61 Hahn held that tenants
in government-subsidized housing projects could not obtain ju-
dicial review of the Federal Housing Authority's approval of
rent increases. The court said that the availability of review
should turn on three factors: "first, the appropriateness of the
issues raised for review by the courts; second, the need for judi-
cial supervision to safeguard the interests of the plaintiffs; and
third, the impact of review on the effectiveness of the agency in
carrying out its assigned role."162 In adopting this approach, the
First Circuit relied on a study by Harvey Saferstein.63 Still one
of the finest treatments of section 701(a)(2), Saferstein's article
identified eight factors that courts often considered relevant in
deciding whether a given action was "committed to agency dis-
cretion."' ' Saferstein explicitly urged courts to consider these
and perhaps still other factors when faced with unreviewability
claims in individual cases. 65
The chief difficulty with Hahn was not that it had been
wrongly decided - although the court's holding has been con-
troversial 66 - but that its open-ended reading of section
701(a)(2) could potentially lead to any result that a particular
court might desire. One could have predicted that the Supreme
Court would not be prepared to live indefinitely with such a
catholic approach. Thus, the time was ripe for the Court to fur-
nish more clear-cut guidelines for the application of section
701(a)(2). The question that will have to be asked, however, is
61. 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970).
62. Id. at 1249.
63. Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed
to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
64. The eight factors were: broad agency discretion; expertise and experi-
ence required to understand subject matter of agency action; managerial na-
ture of agency; impropriety of judicial intervention; necessity of informal
agency decision making, inability of reviewing court to ensure correct result;
need for expeditious operation of congressional programs; quantity of poten-
tially appealable agency actions; and existence of other methods of preventing
abuses of discretion. Id at 380-95.
65. Id. at 396-97.
66. Compare Frakes v. Pierce, 700 F.2d 501, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1983) (collect-
ing cases following Hahn) with R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra
note 58, § 5.3.1, at 138 (arguing that court's opinion is "poorly reasoned").
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whether the Court went too far in the opposite direction - to-
ward excessive rigidity.
B. OVERTON PARK
The Supreme Court advanced its first general explanation
of the meaning of section 701(a)(2) in Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.67 The plaintiffs, a citizen group, chal-
lenged a decision of the Secretary of Transportation approving
a proposed highway route that would bisect a public park. The
citizen group relied on two identically worded highway funding
statutes that forbade the use of public park land for road con-
struction unless there was "no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive."68 Ultimately, the Court remanded the case so the lower
courts could decide whether the Secretary had properly applied
the statutory criterion.69 Before reaching the merits, however,
the Court considered whether plaintiffs were entitled to any ju-
dicial review. After finding that review was not precluded by
statute, the Court continued:
Similarly, the Secretary's decision here does not fall within the
exception for action "committed to agency discretion." This is a very
narrow exception .... The legislative history of the Administrative
Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances
where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply.
' 70
The Court then construed the words "no feasible and pru-
dent alternative" in the highway funding statutes as requiring
the Secretary to give "paramount importance" to protection of
park land, unless there were "extraordinary" levels of cost or
community disruption, or other "truly unusual" factors.71 On
this premise, the Supreme Court had no trouble disposing of
the section 701(a)(2) argument: "Plainly, there is 'law to apply'
and thus the exemption for action 'committed to agency discre-
tion' is inapplicable." 72
The four sentences quoted above constituted the Court's
only analysis of section 701(a)(2). Indeed, under the circum-
stances, the brevity of the Court's discussion was not surprising.
The Overton Park case was decided on an expedited timetable:
only three months elapsed from the day the Supreme Court
67. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
68. Id at 405.
69. Id at 420-21.
70. Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP., supra note 33, at 26) (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 412-13.
72. Id at 413.
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granted review until the day when the decision came down.73
Technical errors pervading the Court's opinion on a variety of
issues74 suggest that this hurried pace was not without its costs.
Moreover, the Secretary had not even argued that the agency
action was unreviewable, and therefore the briefing on section
701(a)(2) had been almost negligible.75 These background cir-
cumstances may help explain some of the serious flaws in the
Court's apparent holding that the applicability of section
701(a)(2) turns solely on whether there is "law to apply" to the
agency decision.
The most fundamental flaw in this position was that the
Court seemed to obscure the distinction between the issue of
reviewabiity and the issue of legality.76 The Court drew its "no
law to apply" test from the language of the Senate Judiciary
Committee report on the APA.77 Under the theory of that re-
port, as disussed above, 78 an agency action is "committed to
agency discretion" only when there are no grounds on which
the action could possibly be set aside. When this condition is
met, however, the agency action obviously would survive judi-
73. Certiorari was granted December 7, 1970. Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 400 U.S. 939 (1970). The decision was handed down
March 2, 1971. 401 U.S. at 402.
74. The most significant error was the Court's holding, 401 U.S. at 420,
that informal agency decisions must be reviewed on the basis of an exclusive
"administrative record." See Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking Under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CH. L. REV.
401, 419-21 (1975) (demonstrating that Court's view of APA was historically in-
accurate); see also 401 U.S. at 414 (incorrectly stating that the substantial evi-
dence test applies during judicial review of rulemaking proceedings under 5
U.S.C. § 553); id. at 417 (incorrectly describing City of Yonkers v. United
States, 320 U.S. 685 (1944), as a case in which "the nature of the agency action
[was] ambiguous").
75. The only party discussing § 701(a)(2) was the State of Tennessee,
which argued against reviewability. See Reply Brief of Respondent Charles
Speight, Com'r Tenn. Dep't of Hwys., at 37-39.
76. The courts' propensity for confusing these two concepts is not con-
fined to administrative law cases. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 636-38 (1971)
(chiding judges for failing to distinguish between "primary discretion," the
right of a court to act as it chooses, and "secondary discretion," the absence of
review by a higher court); see also Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986
DUKE L.J. 747, 747-50 (elaborating on Rosenberg's analysis).
77. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. As discussed below, the Court did not
actually vitiate § 701(a)(2) to the extent suggested by the Senate report. See
infra notes 84, 93 and accompanying text. Because the Court justified the
"law to apply" test solely on the basis of legislative history, however, the per-
suasiveness of its position had to depend in large part on the credibility of the
report.
78. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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cial review in any event. Consequently, this view would make
section 701(a)(2) mere surplusage, because the APA would gen-
erate exactly the same results without the clause as with it. In-
deed, the report's theory renders the idea of unreviewability
meaningless. Before declaring that a particular type of agency
action could not conceivably be reversed, a conscientious court
surely will examine the challenger's contentions to see if any of
them has arguable merit. Yet this is essentially the same in-
quiry that the court would conduct if it were examining the
agency action on the merits. Under the Senate report's theory,
therefore, only by actually reviewing an agency action can a
court declare that the action is unreviewable!79
To the extent that the "law to apply" formula restricted
the scope of section 701(a)(2), the Court's position was some-
what understandable, despite the weakness of its analytical un-
derpinnings. Justice Marshall's professed desire to treat the
clause as a "very narrow" exception was well served by a rule
that meant, in effect, that no agency action would be deemed
"committed to agency discretion" in the face of a colorable
claim that the agency had exceeded its statutory mandate.
Although this position was clearly a departure from some prior
case law,80 it was a reasonable extrapolation of other prece-
dents in which the Court had considered hospitality to judicial
review a dominant theme of the APA.8 ' Finally, although the
Court easily could have questioned the authoritativeness of the
Senate report,8 2 the Court's heavy reliance on the report was
consistent with orthodox statutory construction doctrine.83
79. In Overton Park itself, when the Court reached the issue of whether
the Secretary had acted within the scope of his authority, it simply referred
back to its earlier discussion of whether there was "law to apply." Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 416. The Court already had examined that issue at the "re-
viewability" stage, and there was nothing more for it to examine at the "mer-
its" stage.
80. Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317-19 (1958); Cur-
ran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
81. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Heikkila
v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).
82. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Some suggest that the Sen-
ate report supports a broader concept of unreviewability than the Court ac-
knowledged, because the sentence from which the Court quoted contains the
words "for example" and thus did not purport to exhaust the circumstances
under which an action could be held unreviewable. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It would appear from the con-
text, however, that the authors of the report used the "law to apply" sentence
as an "example" of their position that § 701(a)(2) did not diminish the availa-
bility of judicial review under the APA. Thus, the question to ask about the
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What was more puzzling about the Overton Park test was
the kind of unreviewability that it preserved. Consider a case
in which the relevant statutes have granted the agency sweep-
ing discretion, but the challenger claims the agency has exer-
cised its discretion improperly. The challenger probably would
assert this claim under section 706(2)(A) of the APA, which
states that an agency action shall be set aside if found to be "ar-
bitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion. '8 4 Under Over-
ton Park, this type of scrutiny - known as arbitrariness review
or abuse of discretion review - is simply unavailable if there is
no "law to apply."
Presumably, if the Court gave any thought to this implica-
tion of the "law to apply" test, it assumed that a reviewing
court simply could not conduct abuse of discretion review with-
out "law to apply." I call this line of analysis the "futility" the-
ory: an action should be deemed "committed to agency
discretion" if judicial review would be infeasible and therefore
futile.8 5 The futility theory is superficially plausible to the ex-
tent one equates abuse of discretion review with an inquiry into
whether the agency used legally relevant factors in exercising
its discretion. 86 If there are no legally relevant factors, the ar-
report's analysis of § 701(a)(2) is not whether the Court read this passage
broadly enough, but whether the report was trustworthy in the first place
(and also, as shown infra note 93 and accompanying text, whether it supported
even the limited unreviewability implied by the "law to apply" test).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). Theoretically the same issues could arise
under the APA's "substantial evidence" test, id. § 706(2)(E). That test, how-
ever, generally comes into play only when a statute requires that an action be
preceded by an "on the record" hearing. In practice, the government never
contends that actions taken under such statutes are "committed to agency dis-
cretion," presumably because the legislature's requirement of an evidentiary
hearing is itself a strong sign that the agency was not expected to wield com-
pletely unsupervised discretion. At least, I know of no case in which such a
contention has been advanced, let alone sustained. But cf Export Administra-
tion Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(a), (c) (1988) (Commerce Department must al-
low a formal hearing before denying an export license, but judicial review is
precluded by statute).
85. Although it may seem unduly speculative to ascribe the futility theory
to the Overton Park Court, the case is commonly interpreted as resting upon
such reasoning. See, e.g., Koch, supra note 22, at 509 (interpreting Overton
Park to mean that in the absence of standards by which to evaluate a decision,
"a court cannot review a decision without usurping the discretionary function
assigned to the agency"). The Court clearly did embrace the theory later in
Chaney. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (concluding that agency rule is arbitrary if "the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider"); Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (stating that
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gument goes, a court obviously cannot conduct this inquiry.8 7
This reasoning, however, completely ignores certain addi-
tional theories that today's courts routinely use in reviewing
agency actions for abuse of discretion. A plaintiff might claim,
for example, that the agency misunderstood the facts, that it
departed from its precedents without a good reason, that it did
not reason in a minimally plausible fashion, or that it made an
unconscionable value judgment. These arguments can be called
"pure" abuse of discretion theories, because they do not rest on
an assertion that the agency misunderstood its governing stat-
ute or any other source of legal constraints. Although these
theories were only beginning to emerge at the time of Overton
Park,s8 each of them is now a well established component of
substantive judicial review doctrine.8 9 Of course, some com-
mentators have vigorously criticized pure abuse of discretion
review.90 In careless or impulsive hands, such review certainly
can lead to excessive judicial interference in the regulatory pro-
cess. Nevertheless, this type of judicial review is an integral
part of contemporary administrative law practice and shows no
signs of going away.9 1
When these aspects of scope-of-review doctrine are consid-
ered, the futility theory's weakness immediately becomes evi-
dent. Pure abuse of discretion inquiries do not depend on the
contents of the statute under which an agency acts; therefore, it
is illogical to suppose that the lack of "law to apply" makes
these inquiries unworkable. If judicial review of the agency's
factual perceptions, logic, and consistency is acceptable when
abuse of discretion review entails consideration of "whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors"); Levin, supra note 27, at 250-
53 (interpreting Overton Park's "relevant factors" test to mean factors im-
posed by statute or other source of binding law).
87. Professor Rogers appears to assume that this is the only meaning of
abuse of discretion review. See Rogers, supra note 46, at 777. It is for this rea-
son, apparently, that he finds nothing anomalous about the Overton Park "law
to apply" test. See idt at 788-92.
88. The Overton Park Court did recognize pure abuse of discretion review
in at least a rudimentary way. See 401 U.S. at 416 (stating that action is an
abuse of discretion if "there has been a clear error of judgment").
89. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 27, at 253-60 (cataloguing and citing author-
ity for these and other abuse of discretion theories). For a fuller discussion,
including apposite Supreme Court cases, see infra notes 117-19 and accompa-
nying text.
90. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 2, at 292-99; Smith, supra note 3, at 454.
91. See Levin, supra note 27, at 259-60 (noting criticisms but anticipating
only marginal changes in near future). See generally Garland, supra note 3, at
525-61 (analyzing the standard and scope of review appropriate for administra-
tive deregulation cases).
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the agency operates under significant statutory restrictions, it
should be no less acceptable when the agency is not doing so.92
The restrictive aspects of the "law to apply" test might
have been understandable if the legislative history on which
the Court relied had strongly impelled the Court to embrace
that approach. Just the opposite is the case, however: The
Overton Park Court purported to extract from the APA's legis-
lative history a lesson that clearly was not there. The crucial
sentence from the Senate report read as follows: "If, for exam-
ple, statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply, courts of course have no statutory
question to review."93 By its terms, this sentence dealt only
with "statutory questions." Yet the questions the Overton
Park test appeared to shield from judicial scrutiny (in the ab-
sence of "law to apply") were nonstatutory, and obviously the
quoted sentence said nothing about the circumstances in which
courts should or should not decide such questions.
The Supreme Court's cursory analysis of section 701(a)(2)
in Overton Park, then, left the law of unreviewability in a de-
cidedly unstable state. The Court's apparent willingness to
hear any challenge based on "law" was not the main difficulty;
the Court might later retreat from this bold stand, but at least
one could perceive logical reasons for the Court's position.
Rather, the main difficulty was that the Court had, for no ap-
parent reason, prohibited courts from engaging in abuse of dis-
cretion review in the absence of "law to apply." The Court's
declared premise that the exemption must remain "very nar-
row" could not have supported this prohibition, because the
"law to apply" test, in this regard, restricted review. The prohi-
bition simply seemed to erect a formalistic barrier to judicial
92. The analysis in the text is similar, but not identical, to that of Profes-
sor Davis. He argues that, even in the absence of "law to apply," a reviewing
court can always test an agency's exercise of discretion against "such omni-
present standards as justice, fairness, and reasonableness." Davis, "No Law to
Apply"; 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 6 (1988). Many administrative lawyers (and
more than a few judges) would likely believe, however, that Davis's open-
ended phrasing risks the very dangers of judicial usurpation that a doctrine of
unreviewability is supposed to prevent. In my view, the present case law on
abuse of discretion review identifies a number of relatively conservative theo-
ries by which a court may consider reversing agencies on grounds that are in-
dependent of "law." One can, therefore, demonstrate the inadequacy of the
futility theory without any need to bless judicial discretion as unequivocally as
Davis seems to contemplate.
93. S. REP., supra note 33, at 26, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 33, at 212.
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review.9 4 One could have predicted, therefore, that when abuse
of discretion claims arose in later cases, Overton Park would
carry only limited moral authority.
C. HECKLER V. CHANEY
For the next fourteen years, the Supreme Court said virtu-
ally nothing more about section 701(a)(2).9-9 Meanwhile, of
course, the lower courts had to decide cases as they arose.
Some courts applied the Overton Park test as it read, foreclos-
ing judicial review when the statute appeared to contain no
substantive guidance.96 At times, these courts seemed unaware
that an administrative action potentially could be an abuse of
discretion even if there were no law to apply to the agency's de-
cision.97 Other courts, however, steered clear of the "law to ap-
ply" formula and reverted to the "pragmatic" reasoning of
Hahn98 and other cases predating Overton Park.99 A promi-
94. Professor Schauer writes that the term "formalistic" should not neces-
sarily be regarded as derogatory, because in some contexts formalistic rules
can supply needed stability and predictability. See Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509, 509-10, 538-44 (1988). Although this point may be well taken,
the "committed to agency discretion" doctrine is one area in which formalism
has caused more difficulties than it has solved.
95. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979), the plaintiffs
challenged the decision of an agency to release commercially sensitive infor-
mation. The Court noted: 'Were we simply confronted with the authorization
in 5 U.S.C. § 301 to prescribe regulations regarding 'the custody, use, and pres-
ervation of [agency] records, papers and property,' it would be difficult to de-
rive any standards limiting agency conduct which might constitute 'law to
apply."' Id. at 317. The Court did not decide this question, however, because
it found that the agency also was governed by a criminal statute that placed
stricter limitations on its ability to disclose trade secrets. Id. at 318.
In Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444 (1979), the
Court rejected judicial review of the ICC's decision not to commence an inves-
tigation of filed rates. One reason was the absence of any substantive limits on
the face of the statute; the Court cited Overton Park, preceded by a "cf." Id at
455. Ultimately, however, the Court's holding rested on a perception that Con-
gress had impliedly precluded judicial review. See id. at 454, 462.
96. E.g., California v. Settle, 708 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1983); Jaymar-
Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 651 F.2d 506, 510-13 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding decision of FTC
to release its investigative files exempt from judicial review); Greater New
York Hosp. Ass'n v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 494, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding tim-
ing of Medicare payment dates not subject to judicial review).
97. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1979)
rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
98. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Intercity Transp. Co. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103, 106 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (noting a strong presumption in favor of judicial review unless such
review would impair effective agency administration); Bullard v. Webster, 623
F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1980) (calling for "a weighing of the need for, and fea-
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nent line of decisions, mainly from the District of Columbia
Circuit, asserted that inquiry into whether there is "law to ap-
ply" should itself turn on pragmatic considerations °0 0 - a prop-
osition that was so illogical on its face as to be tantamount to
open rebellion against the Overton Park analysis. Thus, the un-
reviewability case law was split badly when, in 1985, the
Supreme Court reentered the fray with its decision in Heckler
v. Chaney.10 '
Rarely does the Court hear an administrative law case in
which the underlying facts favor the government's side as
strongly as did those in Chaney. The case began when eight
death row prisoners wrote to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), contending that state governments' use of lethal
drug injections as a means of capital punishment violated the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, because the drugs were not
"safe and effective" for human execution.10 2 They asked the
FDA Commissioner to proceed against state authorities who
were using the drugs for such "unauthorized" purposes.10 3
When the Commissioner refused, the prisoners sought judicial
review.1 0 4
The district court dismissed the complaint, but the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the FDA's rejection
of the prisoner's request was reviewable and had been arbitrary
and capricious. 10 5 Then-Judge Scalia dissented, asserting that
the FDA's decision should be considered unreviewable as an
exercise of traditional prosecutorial discretion. 0 6 In a follow-
up opinion, he also protested the D.C. Circuit's frequent resort
sibility of, judicial review versus the potential for disruption of the administra-
tive process"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981); Local 2855, AFGE v. United
States, 602 F.2d 574, 578-80 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that application of § 701(a)(2)
requires a "weighing of the practical and policy implications of reviewability").
Professor Davis's strenuous criticism of the "law to apply" test helped fuel this
resistance. See K. DAVIS, ADMNnTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 28:16
(1976). For Davis's later and more complete critique, see 5 K. DAVIS, supra
note 32, § 28:8, at 290-97.
100. E.g., Local 1219, AFGE v. Donovan, 683 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir. 1979); accord
Tuepker v. FmHA, 708 F.2d 1329, 1332 (8th Cir. 1983).
101. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
102. IdE at 823-24.
103. Id. at 824.
104. Id at 825.
105. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470
U.S. 821, 827 (1985).
106. 1d, at 1192-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to pragmatic considerations, rather than the Overton Park "law
to apply" test, in deciding questions of reviewability.10 7
The bizarre nature of the prisoners' requested relief made
it easy to predict that the Supreme Court would find some way
to reverse the court of appeals.'08 But the Court never reached
the merits. Instead, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist
and joined by seven other Justices, the Court held broadly that
an agency refusal to institute investigative or enforcement pro-
ceedings was "presumptively unreviewable."' 10 9 This presump-
tion could be rebutted when Congress furnished "law to apply"
in the form of substantive guidelines circumscribing an agency's
enforcement discretion.110 Congress had not, however, placed
relevant limits on the FDA's freedom to decline to use its en-
forcement authority, and therefore the court of appeals' deci-
sion had to be reversed. 11 Only Justice Marshall rejected the
Court's analysis. He argued, in a lengthy opinion concurring in
the result, that the FDA's decision was reviewable, but should
be upheld on the merits." 2
On the surface, Chaney appeared to be a strong vindication
of the Overton Park test of unreviewability; most commenta-
tors have read it that way.113 When the Court's reasoning is
scrutinized, however, Chaney proves to be just the opposite.
The Court subtly undermined the "law to apply" formalism,
substituting a decidedly functional approach. This conclusion
emerges from an examination of three aspects of the Court's
reasoning: 1) its general exegesis of the meaning of section
701(a)(2); 2) its explanation of why exercises of enforcement
107. Chaney v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 1030, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
108. The equitable argument supporting the court of appeals' holding was
that lethal drugs might cause excessive pain to prisoners to whom they were
administered. See 718 F.2d at 1177-78. Even in this respect, however, the
plaintiffs' case was shaky, because, as the dissent in the court of appeals noted,
states had turned to the lethal injection method of capital punishment largely
because it was considered less painful than alternative methods such as elec-
trocution. See id. at 1197 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Glass v. Louisiana,
471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (sug-
gesting that electrocution should be considered "cruel and unusual
punishment").
109. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
110. I& at 832-35.
111. Id at 835-37.
112. 1i at 840-55 (Marshall, J., concurring).
113. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 92, at 3; The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99
HARv. L. REV. 120, 270 (1985); Note, The Impact of Heckler v. Chaney on Judi-
cial Review of Agency Decisions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1986).
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discretion "presumptively" fall within that provision; and 3) its
suggestions about the circumstances in which such agency dis-
cretion might nevertheless be reviewable.
1. C aney and the "law to apply" test
Before turning to the specific question of enforcement dis-
cretion, Justice Rehnquist presented what appeared to be a
general theoretical framework for analysis of section 701(a)(2).
He quoted at length from Overton Park, explaining its con-
struction of the clause in light of what I call the "futility" the-
ory.114 That is, he read section 701(a)(2) to mean that
review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's ex-
ercise of discretion.... This construction avoids conflict with the
"abuse of discretion" standard of review in § 706 - if no judicially
manageable standards are available for judging how and when an
agency should exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate
agency action for "abuse of discretion." 115
Unfortunately, this explanation did not come to grips with
the problems in the Overton Park analysis. If the only agency
actions that fall within section 701(a)(2) are actions that could
not, in any "meaningful" or "judicially manageable" sense, be
deemed abuses of discretion, the concept of unreviewability
serves no purpose. Such agency actions would survive "merits"
scrutiny under section 706 in any event. Thus, the Court's ex-
planation of the "law to apply" test did not solve the problem
of devising a rationale for section 701(a)(2) under which the
clause would not be superfluous. 116 Moreover, even if one ac-
cepts the premise that unreviewability should depend on the
availability of "meaningful standards," the "law to apply" anal-
ysis falsely assumes that a broad statute makes judicial review
unworkable. The truth is that, regardless of how broadly "the
statute is drawn," courts typically have some "judicially man-
ageable standards" available for abuse of discretion review.
114. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
115. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830.
116. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. Curiously, Justice
Rehnquist brought up the surplusage issue himself in the same context. He
observed that the two clauses of § 701(a) could be read as calling for identical
inquiries, Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828-30; see supra note 50, but sought to avoid
such an overlap because of "the common-sense principle of statutory construc-
tion that sections of a statute generally should be read 'to give effect, if possi-
ble, to every clause."' Chaney, 470 U.S. at 829 (quoting United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)). He seemed not to notice that, although
the futility theory did distinguish § 701(a)(1) from § 701(a)(2), it did not sug-
gest any function for the latter clause that § 706 does not serve on its own.
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The peculiar facts of Chaney provide a good illustration of
the latter point, for one can easily conceive of ways in which
the Commissioner could have abused his discretion in respond-
ing to the prisoners' petition, even if we assume that the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not limit the FDA's enforcement
discretion. Suppose, for example, the FDA had declined to pro-
ceed against execution drugs on the ground that they were not
dangerous at all. If the record contained strong contrary evi-
dence, a court might regard this decision as arbitrary, because a
regulatory decision that rests on unjustifiable factual assump-
tions is an abuse of discretion.117 Alternatively, suppose that
the Commissioner had denied the prisoners' petition on the
ground that anyone who is sentenced to capital punishment
should die an agonizing, lingering death. Quite apart from the
question of whether anything in the statute bears on this ra-
tionale, one can easily picture a judge holding that deliberate
cruelty is an unconscionable basis for decision, and therefore an
abuse of discretion - a "clear error of judgment," in the words
of Overton Park."8 Finally, suppose the Commissioner had an-
nounced that the FDA would not act on the petition because
the agency wished to leave the issue to state-level health of-
ficers. This rationale would be completely illogical, because
such officers could not override state statutes requiring execu-
tion by injection. As such, the rationale for the FDA's refusal
to proceed against execution drugs could be challenged as lack-
ing the "reasoned analysis" required under abuse of discretion
case law.119
117. The case would resemble Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S.
610 (1986), in which the Supreme Court set aside rules prohibiting hospitals
from withholding treatment from handicapped infants over their parents' ob-
jections; the rules lacked an adequate factual basis, because there was no evi-
dence that any hospital had ever engaged in this conduct. Id at 630-36. See
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (dictum) (rule is arbitrary if agency's "explanation for its decision...
runs counter to the evidence before the agency"); Levin, supra note 27, at 274-
75 (discussing lack of factual support as a form of arbitrariness).
118. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971); see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (dictum) (stating that "an explanation
[that] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise" is arbitrary and capricious); Levin, supra note
27, at 253-55 (discussing cases holding unacceptable policy judgments to be
abuses of discretion).
119. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57. In State Farm, the agency rescinded a rule
requiring the automobile industry to adopt either airbags or automatic
seatbelts. The agency explained that automatic seatbelts, the industry's fa-
vored method of meeting the requirement, would be ineffective. The Court re-
versed because, among other reasons, the agency's statement did not explain
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Other examples can be imagined, but these sufficiently
demonstrate why the futility theory, standing alone, could not
have logically supported the Court's finding of unreviewability
in Czaney. In each of the hypothetical cases, the basis for re-
versal would be unrelated to the dictates of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. In short, what the Chaney Court did not ac-
knowledge is that, even if the Act did not contain "manageable
standards" delineating how the Commissioner must use his dis-
cretion, general administrative law doctrine on abuse of discre-
tion identifies certain ways in which he must not use it. Thus,
if the Commissioner's decision in Chaney was to be treated as
"committed to agency discretion," the reason could not be that
a court could not possibly find any abuses of his discretion, but
rather that there were good reasons for the Court to refrain
from looking for such abuse.120
2. C Vaney and the pragmatic calculus
On some level, the Court evidently was aware that Overton
Park alone could not persuasively support a holding that the
FDA Commissioner's decision was unreviewable. For, after ex-
pounding the above elaboration of the "law to apply" test, the
Court abruptly laid the test aside and began to discuss various
practical considerations that demonstrated the "general unsuit-
ability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse
enforcement."'- 21
At least some of these practical arguments were persua-
sive. Perhaps the strongest argument was that, when an agency
decides which alleged law violators it will pursue, it must take
into account such variables as its chances of prevailing in the
action, its overall regulatory priorities, and competing uses for
why it had abandoned airbags as well. See generally Levin, supra note 27, at
255-56, 259-60 (discussing agency's illogical reasoning and lack of reasoned
decisionmaking as bases for reversal).
120. One might defend the Court by arguing that the terms "meaningful"
and "judicially manageable," in the block quotation above, were meant to be
heavily loaded phrases, to be equated with "suitable" or "appropriate." Under
this reading of the quoted paragraph, the Court was saying that a decision is
"committed to agency discretion" when abuse of discretion review would be a
poor idea, albeit not necessarily infeasible. Even if the paragraph can be read
that way, however, which probably is not the way it was intended, the analytic
conclusion would be the same: the ChIzaney holding cannot be defended on a
futility theory, but only on the basis of whatever practical considerations are
thought to make judicial review of the particular decision "inappropriate."
121. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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its limited budget and personnel. 2 2 Judicial supervision of
these choices might not be impossible, but it would at least be
unusually difficult. Even many observers who favor a narrow
application of Chaney concede that the managerial nature of
agencies' decisions about how they can best deploy scarce re-
sources warrants considerable solicitude from the courts during
judicial review. 23 Moreover, there was force to the Court's
comment that "when an agency does act to enforce, that action
itself provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the
agency must have exercised its power in some manner."'24 The
Court apparently meant that judicial review of agency inaction
may be "unfocused" because the court cannot know what meas-
ures the agency ultimately would have adopted if it had com-
menced a proceeding. 2 5
Justice Rehnquist's other arguments for the presumptive
unreviewability of agencies' nonenforcement decisions were
weaker and might even be considered makeweights. First, the
Court argued that "when an agency refuses to act it generally
does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty
or property rights."'1 26 Even if one were to accept the dubious
premise that persons coerced by agency action deserve review
more than persons who hope to benefit from such action,127 the
122. Id. at 831-32.
123. See, e.g., Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative
Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 389 (1987) (panel discussion) [hereinafter Con-
servative Era] (remarks of Alan B. Morrison); id. at 392-93 (remarks of Cass
Sunstein). According to these two commentators, resource allocation consider-
ations should affect the scope of review, rather than reviewability. See also
Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1193, 1267-71 (1982) (reviewing how courts have hesitated to create private
rights of initiation because of their awareness of agencies' resource
limitations).
124. Chancy, 470 U.S. at 832.
125. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031,
1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (explaining why an agency's failure to adopt regula-
tions at the end of a rulemaking proceeding is more amenable to review than a
refusal even to initiate rulemaking proceedings).
126. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
127. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 476-77 (arguing that interests of regula-
tory beneficiaries should not be subordinated to those of regulated parties, be-
cause congressional concern for the former is shown by the existence of the
statutory scheme itself); see also Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 891-93 (1987) (similar analysis). The distinction between coerced par-
ties and benefit-seekers, a common theme in the literature of a generation ago,
seems obsolete in an age in which the legal system has increasingly treated
"new property" interests in the same manner as traditionally protected inter-
ests. See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 20-22 (1983); Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Fed-
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Court's argument was strikingly overbroad. Numerous agency
decisions that courts routinely review are also noncoercive: for
instance, appeals from denials of Social Security disability bene-
fits make up a large fraction of the federal courts' caseload.
The Court also drew an analogy between agency inaction and a
prosecutor's decision not to seek a criminal indictment - ignor-
ing substantial differences between the two factual contexts.128
This Article is not the place for a detailed exploration of
whether agency enforcement discretion should be judicially re-
viewable. Other commentators have treated that topic in depth
elsewhere.12 9 What is important is the role of functional argu-
ments in the structure of the Chaney Court's analysis. The
opinion's pointed reliance on those arguments demonstrated
that the Court was not interested in a straightforward applica-
tion of its earlier futility analysis. Had the Court been pre-
pared to adhere strictly to the Overton Park "law to apply"
test, such policy considerations would have been irrelevant, and
the case would have been over almost immediately. Thus,
although Justice Rehnquist did not offer a precise concept of
how the two parts of his analysis fit together, the Court evi-
dently was groping toward a more complex approach to section
701(a)(2), in which the absence of "law to apply" would be an
important factor militating against reviewability, but not neces-
sarily a dispositive factor. 30
Part of the reason that Chaney has been mistakenly inter-
preted as a simple reaffirmation of Overton Park is that, in ad-
dressing the circumstances in which the Chaney presumption
against review of nonenforcement decisions could be rebutted,
the Court focused on what it termed a "law to apply" issue. A
plaintiff could overcome the presumption by showing that a
eral Benefit Disbursement: Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97 HARv. L.
REV. 778, 780-82 (1984).
128. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 847-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (beneficiaries
of regulatory schemes have a direct and tangible stake in enforcement, tran-
scending society's generalized interest in criminal law enforcement; and the
overall trend in administrative law has been away from unconstrained discre-
tion); Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
627, 657-61 (1983).
129. K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-214 (1969); Colker, Administra-
tive Prosecutorial Indiscretion, 63 TUL. L. REV. 877 (1989); Sunstein, supra
note 52, at 665-75; see also A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 52-75 (1981)
(advocating judicial review of criminal prosecutors); Thomforde, Controlling
Administrative Sanctions, 74 MICH. L. REV. 709, 734-57 (1976) (evaluating judi-
cial review of administrative sanctions).
130. For an articulation of one such approach, see infra note 301-04 and ac-
companying text.
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statute prescribed substantive priorities or other limits on an
agency's enforcement discretion.131 As an example, the Court
referred to its 1975 decision in Dunlop v. Bachowski,132 which
had permitted judicial review of the Secretary of Labor's deci-
sion not to challenge a union election under the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). 33 The key to
the Dunlop holding, Justice Rehnquist explained, was that the
language of the LMRDA had constrained the Secretary's en-
forcement discretion, directing him to file suit "if he finds prob-
able cause to believe that a violation... has occurred."'u 4 The
statutory directive, therefore, had provided "law" that a review-
ing court could properly enforce.1 35
In this portion of the Chaney opinion, however, the phrase
"law to apply" served a function that was entirely different
from its role in Overton Park. The Court did not treat the ab-
sence of law to apply as a self-sufficient reason for the rule of
unreviewability; rather, it regarded the availability of law to ap-
ply as a limitation on a rule of unreviewability that was largely
rooted in practical considerations. 136 The distinction is subtle
but significant. The Court's position implied that examination
of a wide range of functional considerations would not neces-
sarily be foreclosed when courts faced novel reviewability is-
sues in later cases. Such courts might decide, as Chaney had,
131. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833.
132. 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
134. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833-34 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982)).
135. Id at 834. This was a somewhat questionable reading of Dunlop, a de-
cision from which Justice Rehnquist himself had dissented. The extent of the
Court's revisionism need not be explored here, however. Post-Chaney cases
have generally interpreted Dunlop as having meant what the Chaney Court
claimed it meant, and therefore this Article will do the same.
136. See Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1549 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that
"[t]he Court did not directly utilize the 'no law to apply' test to resolve the
case"). Perhaps the most easily misinterpreted aspect of the Court's discussion
was Justice Rehnquist's remark that the decision to find prosecutorial discre-
tion reviewable in Dunlop "was not based on 'pragmatic considerations' ...
that amount to an assessment of whether the interests at stake are important
enough to justify intervention in the agencies' decisionmaking." Chaney, 470
U.S. at 834 (quoting the opinion below). Some have read this remark as saying
that the nature of the plaintiff's interests should have no bearing on the ques-
tion of whether there should be a presumption of unreviewability in the first
place. See, e.g., California Human Dev. Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1052
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring). But the Court could not have seri-
ously intended to exclude the plaintiff's interests from the unreviewability
calculus. Only two pages earlier, the Court had focused on exactly that varia-
ble as a justification for the Chaney rule itself. See supra note 126 and accom-
panying text.
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that a given agency determination should be reviewed only on
the basis of "law," but that outcome would not be a foregone
conclusion.
3. Chaney's caveats
A final bit of evidence that the Court was not strictly wed-
ded to the futility theory was Justice Rehnquist's readiness to
mention situations in which the Chaney rule might not come
into play. The Dunlop type of case did not appear to be the
only one in which a plaintiff could overcome the Chaney "pre-
sumption." In asides and footnotes scattered throughout the
opinion, the Court hinted that agency inaction might be review-
able 1) where the agency refused to commence rulemaking pro-
ceedings; 137 2) where the plaintiff alleged that the agency's
nonenforcement decision contravened the Constitution 38 or
the agency's rules;139 3) where the agency's inaction was "based
solely on the belief that it lacks jurisdiction;"'140 or 4) where
"the agency has 'consciously and expressly adopted a general
policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its
statutory responsibilities."'141 Moreover, the tenor of the Cha-
ney opinion did not indicate that these escape routes were the
only ones that the Court would consider upholding. Indeed,
Justice Brennan suggested in his concurring opinion that the
Chaney holding would not prevent a court from reviewing alle-
gations that an agency's nonenforcement decision had resulted
from bribery, although he assumed that the Court had not ex-
plicitly reserved this possibility.1'
Neither Justice Rehnquist nor Justice Brennan seriously
attempted to explain how these qualifications could be recon-
ciled with the "law to apply" analysis that the Court's opinion
purported to endorse.' 43 Collectively, however, these reserved
137. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 825 n.2.
138. Id at 838.
139. Id at 836.
140. Id at 833 n.4.
141. Id. (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(en banc)).
142. Id at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although Justice Brennan did
not elaborate, probably the simplest way to justify review in such a case would
be to argue that the federal criminal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)-(c)
(1988), furnishes "law to apply" to the agency's decision. See Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979) (finding that where government's release of
commercially valuable information would violate a criminal statute, disclosure
may be enjoined under the APA).
143. In conjunction with the third and fourth potential exceptions noted in
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issues reinforced the impression that the Court was prepared to
embrace a far more complex conception of section 701(a)(2)
than the Overton Park reasoning alone could sustain. Or, at
the very least, these qualifications suggested that Justice Rehn-
quist had been able to attract near-unanimous support for his
opinion only by conspicuously leaving room for such
complexity.
In summary, the Chaney opinion suffered from a deep the-
oretical inconsistency. Although Justice Rehnquist initially at-
tempted to make sense of Overton Park, he then effectively
acknowledged the inadequacy of the "law to apply" reasoning
by resting the Chaney rule of presumptive unreviewability
largely on pragmatic grounds. The Court therefore deserves
credit for shifting unreviewability analysis in Chaney to a more
credible footing than the formalist approach of Overton Park.
Perhaps the Court would have deserved even more credit if the
transformation had not been so poorly articulated as to have es-
caped the notice of so many readers.
D. ICC v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
The Supreme Court's next encounter with section
701(a)(2), in ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
(BLE),1', has not yet attracted much attention. A likely rea-
son for this neglect is that the Court's argument was narrow,
technical, and convoluted; the trade press called the case a
"snoozer."'145 Still, BLE utilized section 701(a)(2) in a fashion
that is unusual at the Supreme Court level, and thus it deserves
more than passing attention.
In BLE, the ICC issued an order in October 1982, allowing
two railroads to use the tracks of a newly consolidated car-
rier.14 6 Under the Hobbs Act,147 which governs judicial review
in this context, challengers had to seek review of the ICC order
the text (inaction resulting from the agency's belief that it lacks jurisdiction or
from abdication of responsibilities), the Court speculated that "in those situa-
tions the statute conferring authority on the agency might indicate that such
decisions were not 'committed to agency discretion."' Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833
n.4. By their nature, however, these exceptions (if they were to be recognized
at all) necessarily would be triggered primarily by the agency's conduct, not by
what the statute had said about the agency's enforcement discretion initially.
Thus, the Court's explanation of why these exceptions might be appropriate
was, to say the least, incomplete.
144. 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
145. Legal Times of Wash., June 15, 1987, at 11, col. 2.
146. BLE, 482 U.S. at 274.
147. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2352 (1982).
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within sixty days of the agency action.148 Six months later,
however, in 1983, two unions requested the ICC to "clarify"
that it had not intended to allow the railroads to use their own
crews in these operations.149 The Commission responded that it
indeed had intended this result and would adhere to it. 150 The
unions requested reconsideration, which the Commission de-
nied in a lengthy opinion.151 The unions then sought review in
the District of Columbia Circuit, which overturned the ICC de-
cision on the merits. 5 2
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, re-
versed the court of appeals. 153 The Court held that, because the
unions had sought reconsideration on grounds that could have
been advanced in the 1982 proceedings, the agency's orders de-
nying their petitions were not subject to judicial review.154 The
Court argued that the statutory time limit in the Hobbs Act
would be undercut if a party were allowed to request agency re-
consideration, claiming that the agency's original decision was
erroneous, and then to file for judicial review of the denial of
reconsideration. 55 Furthermore, the Court said, a judicial "tra-
dition" of declining to review such denials of reconsideration
was "preserved" in section 701(a)(2) of the APA.156 Justice Ste-
vens rejected these propositions in a concurrence joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.-57 He asserted that
the ICC's 1983 orders were reviewable, although he went on to
conclude that the unions should lose on the merits.158
From the standpoint of unreviewability doctrine, BLE had
several salutary aspects. First, the Court liberated itself, sub
silentio, from the constraints of a pure "law to apply" test. Jus-
tice Scalia did not even allude to that criterion for applying sec-
tion 701(a)(2). He had good reason to avoid mentioning the test
- the case on its merits would have turned primarily on statu-
tory construction issues. 59
148. Id. § 2344.
149. BLE, 482 U.S. at 275.
150. Id, at 275-76.
151. Id at 276.
152. I&
153. Id. at 277.
154. Id
155. Id at 281-82.
156. Id at 282.
157. Id, at 287-303 (Stevens, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 287.
159. See id. at 295-300 (reaching the merits and analyzing the relevant
statutes).
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Indeed, the BLE opinion unmistakably sanctioned broad ju-
dicial creativity in shaping the boundaries of section 701(a)(2).
The Court strained to distinguish the situation in the case at
bar from several other situations in which the availability of ju-
dicial review was established by precedent or was obviously es-
sential. Justice Scalia conceded that a party may obtain judicial
review of the ICC's disposition of a motion for reconsideration
if. 1) the Commission reopens the proceedings;160 2) the motion
alleges "new evidence or changed circumstances; 161 or 3) the
Commission, in the guise of clarifying its prior order, actually
changes its substance.162 Regardless of the persuasiveness of
these distinctions, the Court could not have advanced them at
all unless it was prepared to recognize a wide range of policy
arguments as grist for the section 701(a)(2) mill.
Furthermore, BLE was noteworthy for the Court's open
treatment of the reviewing courts' capabilities as a relevant fac-
tor in applying section 701(a)(2). First, Justice Scalia pointed
out that "[t]he vast majority of denials of reconsideration ...
are made without statement of reasons.1 63 Thus, he main-
tained, judicial review of such denials would rarely be worka-
ble. This was a valid point, although the Court could have
probed it more deeply. In a way it begged the question, because
a reviewing court could, under familiar doctrine, force an
agency to provide a statement of reasons for its action in order
to facilitate the review process.1- After a few such remands
the Commission undoubtedly would feel obliged to start writing
explanations for its denials of reconsideration on a routine ba-
sis. The Court must have concluded that, in light of the ICC's
160. Id. at 280 (opinion of the Court).
161. Id. at 284; see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1988) (holding
that INS refusal to reopen case in the face of new evidence is reviewable for
abuse of discretion).
162. BLE, 482 U.S. at 286.
163. Id. at 283 (emphasis in original).
164. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943); City of Vernon
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 845 F.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Friendly, Chenery Revisited& Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Admin-
istrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 223 (concluding in part that when an
agency's findings are inadequate or erroneous, "reversal is inevitable . . .to
preserve the meaningful quality of judicial review"). Some of the classic ex-
pressions of this power are found in ICC cases. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973) (stating that "the agency must
set forth clearly the grounds on which it acted"); United States v. Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935) (stating that "[w]e must know what a
decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or
wrong").
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other responsibilities, imposing this extra burden of opinion-
writing was not worthwhile.
In a related vein, the Court referred to "the impossibility
of devising an adequate standard of review" for administrative
denials of petitions for reconsideration.1 65 Justice Scalia noted
that great deference already is given to agency action that is ap-
pealed directly. Thus, courts could not easily devise a standard
of review that was even more deferential.166 Apparently, the
Court feared that judges too often would yield to the tempta-
tion to meddle in supposedly settled agency proceedings.167
More troubling was the Court's response to Justice Ste-
vens' suggestion 16 that the ICC's decision should be reviewable
because it was based on substantive legal grounds rather than
solely on grounds of untimeliness. Justice Scalia denied
that if the agency gives a "reviewable" reason for otherwise unreview-
able action, the action becomes reviewable. To demonstrate the fal-
sity of that proposition it is enough to observe that a common reason
for failure to prosecute an alleged criminal violation is the prosecu-
tor's belief (sometimes publicly stated) that the law will not sustain a
conviction. That is surely an eminently "reviewable" proposition, in
the sense that courts are well qualified to consider the point; yet it is
entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of ju-
dicial review.1
69
There are at least two reasons why the Court's quick refer-
ence to criminal prosecution should not have been "enough" to
dispose of the concurrence's suggestion. First, the propriety of
equating prosecutors with administrative agencies is not self-ev-
ident.170 Second, although courts have not always treated
agency actions as reviewable when the agency gives a "review-
able" reason, many cases have relied on the manageability of
the agency's rationale as a significant factor militating in favor
of review.171 Supported by precedent as well as logic, Justice
Stevens' argument deserved a better response than the major-
ity's brusque dismissal.
Probably, however, one should not read too much into the
quoted passage. Just two years earlier, in Chaney, the Court
165. BLE, 482 U.S. at 282.
166. Id.
167. Indeed, courts have not been conspicuously successful in their other
efforts to devise a standard of review that would be narrower than the usual
arbitrariness standard. See infra notes 394-96 and accompanying text.
168. BLE, 482 U.S. at 290-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. I& at 283 (opinion of the Court).
170. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
171. See infra Part IV. A.
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had explicitly mentioned the possibility that a nonenforcement
decision would be reviewable if the agency had explained its ac-
tion as resting on a lack of jurisdiction. 72 Because the Court
was so careful to leave the issue open in Chaney, 73 it is un-
likely that the Court meant to resolve the question definitively
in BLE in such a casual fashion. Perhaps in future cases the
Supreme Court will give this line of analysis more careful
consideration.
The cursoriness of the quoted passage raises questions
about the thoughtfulness of the BLE decision as a whole. Those
questions become especially pressing when one notices the off-
hand way in which the Court brought section 701(a)(2) into the
analysis in the first place. None of the briefs in the BLE case
had even mentioned that provision, and the Court's reliance on
"tradition" was perfunctory at best.174 The "committed to
agency discretion" rationale was, in short, a strikingly impul-
sive act in an area of administrative law that demands self-re-
straint and circumspection. The flexibility that courts obtain
when implementing section 701(a)(2) without the constraints of
the "law to apply" test imposes a concomitant obligation of in-
tellectual discipline. Otherwise the clause could degenerate
into little more than a makeweight that might be utilized at
will to support otherwise flimsy arguments against the review-
ability of various agency actions.
The actual outcome in BLE arguably exemplifies this dan-
ger, for the Court certainly could have been more lenient. The
majority conceded that if the ICC had responded to the unions'
petition by formally reopening the proceedings and entering a
fresh order rejecting their position, the unions could have
sought judicial review of that order. 75 What the Commission
had actually done, however, was quite similar: the order deny-
ing reconsideration had responded in detail to all of the points
the unions had made. In that sense, the ICC order definitely
was susceptible of judicial review. 7 6 The Court, however, re-
172. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).
173. The Court went even further out of its way to reserve the issue again
in Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 5 n.1 (1985) (per
curiam).174. See BLE, 482 U.S. at 280, 282 (relying solely on one Supreme Court
case - which had turned on specific statutory language - and two court of
appeals cases).
175. Id. at 278, citing United States v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U.S. 424 (1947).
176. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031,
1047 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that "in general, the more complete an
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garded the completeness of the agency's response as entirely
irrelevant. 77
The Court sought to defend its bright line rule by compar-
ing the Commission's orders denying clarification and reconsid-
eration with a court of appeals' order denying rehearing, which
"no one supposes ... is an appealable action.' 178 The analogy
was weak: the ICC is a tribunal with ongoing frontline respon-
sibility for its cases, and as such is more like a district court
than an appellate court. A better comparison, therefore, would
have been to a district court's order denying a motion to reopen
a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Such an order undoubtedly is appealable for abuse of discre-
tion, even if the only basis for the motion is that the court's
original decision was erroneous when rendered.179
Ultimately, whether one approves of the Court's stringency
in BLE must depend on how fully one accepts the Hobbs Act
policy of cutting off review after sixty days. Cases involving
statutes of limitation present some of the strongest rationales
for precluding judicial review: finality is important to the co-
herence of a regulatory program, and the challenging party
cannot complain about never having had a chance to attack the
agency's position. 8 0 The Court's insistence on a formal reopen-
ing of the proceedings (which rarely occurs) as a precondition
agency's consideration of an issue, the more likely it is that the ultimate deci-
sion not to take action will be a proper subject of judicial review").
177. BLE, 482 U.S. at 280-81.
178. Id at 280.
179. In Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978), the
state claimed in a post-judgment motion that the district court had erred in
graning habeas corpus relief without first holding an evidentiary hearing. In
dictum, the Supreme Court noted that if the state had filed this motion under
Rule 60(b), the district court's denial of the motion would have been review-
able for abuse of discretion. Id at 263 & n.7; see also, e.g., Carter v. Albert Ein-
stein Medical Center, 804 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that, because
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as a discovery sanction had been erroneous,
court abused discretion by not reinstating complaint in response to Rule 60
motion filed five months later); Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 154-55 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying de-
fendant's Rule 60(b) motion alleging that original judgment was erroneous as
a matter of law); 7 J. MOORE & J. LuCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.30[3] (2d ed. 1987).
180. See, e.g., Raton Gas Transmission Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 852 F.2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that "finality in agency
decisionmaking and ... protect[ing] justifiable reliance on agency rules" re-
quire time limit enforcement); Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Administrator of
EPA, 799 F.2d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that time limits are important in
finalizing agency actions); see also infra note 298 (discussing proposals to place
time limits on opportunities to challenge factual basis of rules).
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to appeal may thus be viewed as a device to filter out many po-
tential filings in a disfavored category of appeals.' 8 '
In any event, as mentioned earlier, BLE has had no particu-
lar influence on subsequent discussion of section 701(a)(2) -
unsurprisingly, in light of the narrowness of the Court's hold-
ing and, perhaps, the dryness of its discussion. Possibly the
case has had some small impact on practitioners, leading them
to seek reconsideration, and then judicial review, more
promptly than they otherwise might. 8 2 BLE's potentially
larger significance, however, lies in the possibilities that the
case opens up for the concept of unreviewability in various con-
texts. More clearly than any other modern Supreme Court
case, BLE exposes both the opportunities and the dangers that
section 701(a)(2) creates when the constraints of the Overton
Park "law to apply" test are removed.
E. WEBSTER V. DOE
The Supreme Court's latest treatment of section 701(a)(2)
arose in a sensitive, emotionally charged context - a strong
contrast with the arcaneness of BLE. The Court in Webster v.
Doe'8 3 had to be mindful of national security concerns, de-
mands for sexual privacy, and the federal courts' strongly en-
trenched solicitude for constitutional rights. There is good
reason to believe that the high stakes involved in Doe directly
affected the manner in which the Court approached section
701(a)(2).
"John Doe," an employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency, informed his superiors that he was a homosexual. The
Director of the CIA, William Casey, soon discharged Doe from
employment pursuant to section 102(c) of the National Security
181. Cf. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977) (stating that when Sec-
retary denies reconsideration of disability benefits decision, Social Security Act
precludes judicial review, thus "forestall[ing] repetitive or belated litigation of
stale eligibility claims").
182. See Friends of Sierra R.R., Inc. v. ICC, 881 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1166 (1990) (following BLE holding); John D. Copanos
& Sons v. FDA, 854 F.2d 510, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); Western Pac. Stock-
holders' Protective Comm. v. ICC, 848 F.2d 1301, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).
Transportation lawyers tell me that the significance of BLE for their practice
lies less in its unreviewability holding than in its teachings, 482 U.S. at 277,
284-85, about when the time limit for judicial review begins to run. See gener-
ally United Transp. Union v. ICC, 871 F.2d 1114, 1116-18 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (elab-
orating on these teachings).
183. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
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Act.184 Section 102(c) provides that "the Director of Central In-
telligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of
any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem
such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the
United States."'8 5 The CIA's discharge letter did not explain
this decision, except by quoting the statutory language.
Doe sought reinstatement in district court, asserting that
the CIA's dismissal order violated his statutory and constitu-
tional rights. 8 6 The district court ordered the CIA to recon-
sider its decision, and the CIA appealed.1 8 7 The District of
Columbia Circuit remanded because the district court had given
too little deference to the CIA's decision.'8 8 Nevertheless, the
court of appeals completely rejected the government's argu-
ments that the Director's order was immune from judicial
review.' 8 9
The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Doe
could not litigate any claims under the APA, because the Direc-
tor's implementation of section 102(c) was "committed to
agency discretion."' ° In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, the Court examined section 701(a)(2) in light of the "no
law to apply" reasoning of Overton Park and Chaney.191 The
Court concluded that section 102(c) "fairly exudes deference to
the Director, and appears to us to foreclose the application of
any meaningful judicial standard of review.' 9 2 On the other
hand, the Court rejected the government's argument that sec-
tion 102(c) foreclosed judicial review of Doe's claims that his
dismissal had violated his constitutional rights.1 93 The Court
184. National Security Act of 1947, § 102(c) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 403(c) (1982)).
185. Id
186. Doe, 486 U.S. at 595-96.
187. Id at 597-98.
188. Id at 598.
189. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
190. Doe, 486 U.S. at 601.
191. Id. at 599-600.
192. Id. at 600.
193. The Court's two holdings may seem contradictory, because one nor-
mally assumes that constitutional claims against an agency are themselves
conducted pursuant to the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1988). Possibly the
Court agreed vith the plaintiff's theory that his claim arose directly under the
Constitution, without reference to the APA. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 234-44 (1979) (implying cause of action for employment discrimination di-
rectly from the Constitution). Alternatively, the Court may have assumed
that the APA controlled, but that the Director's decision was not "committed
to agency discretion" to such an "extent" as to foreclose review under
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noted that "where Congress intends to preclude judicial review
of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear," and
concluded that the government had failed to make this "height-
ened showing" of legislative intent.194
Justice Scalia dissented. Although agreeing that the dis-
trict court should not entertain any statutory challenges to the
Director's decision, Justice Scalia strongly criticized what he
saw as the Court's narrow focus on the "law to apply" test. He
argued that neither Overton Park and Chaney, nor the legisla-
tive history on which they relied, established that the "law to
apply" test defines the full range of cases from which section
701(a)(2) excludes the courts.195 On the contrary, he continued,
Congress intended section 701(a)(2) to incorporate "the 'com-
mon law' of judicial review of agency action," including such
principles as the political question doctrine, sovereign immu-
nity, equitable restraint, and generalized comity notions. 196 In
light of that common law, as well as the statutory language,
Justice Scalia believed that all of Doe's claims, including the
constitutional ones, were "committed to agency discretion."'19
Perhaps the key to assessing the status of the "law to ap-
ply" test of section 701(a)(2) in light of Doe is the brief dissent-
ing opinion of Justice O'Connor. Like Justice Scalia, she
believed that Doe's complaint should be dismissed.198 Although
she joined the portions of the majority opinion dealing with
APA review, Justice O'Conner added that, according to her un-
derstanding, the Court did not mean to say "that the exception
in section 701(a)(2) is necessarily or fully defined by reference
to statutes 'drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply.' "199
A close reading of the majority opinion confirms Justice
O'Connor's observation. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist
spoke favorably of the "law to apply" reasoning and relied on it
to some extent,200 he never expressly said the test is the only
permissible method of finding an agency action to be "commit-
§ 706(2)(B). See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing partial
unreviewability).
194. Doe, 486 U.S. at 603 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74
(1974)).
195. Id. at 606-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 608 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
197. Id at 606.
198. Id at 605-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. Id at 605 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
200. Id, at 599-600 (opinion of the Court).
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ted to agency discretion." Indeed, the Court made only a cur-
sory and unpersuasive effort to demonstrate that section 102(c)
contained insufficient statutory guidance to make judicial re-
view possible.20 1 The Court's analysis of APA review was domi-
nated by a more generalized notion that Congress had granted
the CIA Director a kind of authority that courts should not
review.2 02
Chief Justice Rehnquist surely realized that section 102(c)
could not easily be characterized as a statute that furnishes "no
law to apply." The only tangible evidence of congressional in-
tent that he could cite was the fact that section 102(c) applies
"whenever the Director 'shall deem such termination necessary
or advisable in the interests of the United States,' . . . not sim-
ply when termination is necessary or advisable to those inter-
ests. '20 3 In the past, however, the Court had not found the
innocuous word "deem" to possess such powerful preclusive
force.20 4 Moreover, the statutory language on its face makes
the national interest the benchmark for any CIA terminations.
One thus would have thought that, as Justice Scalia observed,
the statute "at least excludes dismissal out of personal vindic-
tiveness, or because the Director wants to give the job to his
cousin;"20 5 or, one might add, because of a personal dislike of
homosexuals.
Thus the Court was quickly forced, in spite of itself, to
reach beyond a pure "law to apply" analysis to an appraisal of
the practical limitations of reviewing courts. Chief Justice
Rehnquist commented that a court could not assess a CIA ter-
mination decision "[s]hort of permitting cross-examination of
the Director concerning his views of the Nation's security and
whether the discharged employee was inimical to those inter-
ests.120 6 On the surface, this remark appeared to presuppose
that courts would not be able to proceed at all. Yet under es-
tablished precedent, cross-examination is precisely what a court
would permit if asked to review an otherwise unexplained deci-
sion issued by some other agency.20 7 The Court's revulsion at
201. I& at 600-01.
202. Ia
203. Id at 600 (quoting § 102(c)) (emphasis added by the Court).
204. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) (holding that the statu-
tory term "deem" does not foreclose review of agriculture regulations).
205. Doe, 486 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id at 600 (opinion of the Court).
207. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420-
21 (1971); Levin, supra note 27, at 266. The Court exaggerated the problem to
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this prospect in connection with CIA decisions surely reflected
a reluctance to involve the courts in delicate national security
matters.
The Chief Justice then launched into a discussion of the
"overall structure" of the National Security Act. Quoting from
earlier Supreme Court decisions that had stressed the need for
the CIA Director to be able to trust subordinates and protect
intelligence sources, 208 the Chief Justice concluded that section
102(c) likewise exhibits "the Act's extraordinary deference to
the Director in his decision to terminate individual employ-
ees."209 Here the Chief Justice was not even suggesting that
courts could not, but rather that they should not, review CIA
termination decisions. The imperative of deference was attrib-
uted pro forma to Congress, but no reader of the opinion will
doubt that the Court's own attitudes had become central to its
unreviewability analysis.210
Finally, the Court's decision to permit Doe to litigate his
constitutional claims provided a further demonstration of how
much the Doe opinion was driven by policy considerations. The
Court did not argue that section 102(c) itself supported the dis-
tinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional claims -
and, of course, the language of the statute would not support
such an argument. Nor did the Court argue, as it could have,
that the Constitution furnished "law to apply" to Doe's claims.
Instead, the Court relied on a purely judicial invention: a
superstrong presumption against preclusion of constitutional
some extent. Generally speaking, an agency head can avoid taking the stand
by simply providing a contemporaneous explanation of the decision. See Camp
v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Levin, supra
note 27, at 265. Thus, the specter of cross-examination arises only where, as in
Doe, an action is not explained contemporaneously.
208. Doe, 486 U.S. at 601 (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510
(1980); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 173 (1985)).
209. Id. at 601.
210. The nature of the Court's concerns is not difficult to guess. Indeed,
the Court had articulated its concerns only a few months earlier in Depart-
ment of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). Egan held that the Navy's revo-
cation of a federal employee's security clearance was "committed by law to the
appropriate agency of the Executive Branch." Id. at 526-27. However, the
plaintiff was seeking administrative review by the Merit Systems Protection
Board, not judicial review, and the § 701(a)(2) case law was not on point.
Thus, the Court moved directly to policy: "Predictive judgment of this kind,"
Justice Blackmun wrote, "must be made by those with the necessary exper-
tise," rather than outside observers who lack experience in assessing security
risks. Moreover, military and national security affairs are traditionally within
the province of the Executive. Id. at 528.
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claims.211 The Chief Justice explained that this presumption
was required "in part to avoid the 'serious constitutional ques-
tion' that would arise if a federal statute were construed to
deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim."2' 2
The merits of the underlying constitutional question to
which Chief Justice Rehnquist alluded are beyond the scope of
this Article. The question has been widely debated by federal
courts scholars for years,2 1 3 and probably will be debated fur-
ther in light of Justice Scalia's skillful attack on the anti-pre-
clusion view in Doe.2 1 4 To date, however, the presumption
invoked in Doe has been virtually an article of faith in the
lower courts.2 1 5 Apparently, the presumption stems not only
from the courts' doubts about the constitutionality of preclu-
sion, but also from the perceived preciousness of constitutional
rights216 and from the. expectation that relatively few agency
actions present serious constitutional problems.21 7 For present
purposes, the significant point is the openness with which the
211. Doe, 486 U.S. at 603. The presumption is "superstrong" in the sense
that it has even more force than the normal Abbott Laboratories presumption
favoring judicial review. Cf. supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Abbott Laboratories).
212. Doe, 486 U.S. at 603 (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)).
213. See generally Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV.
895, 900-02 (1984) (discussing various congressional attempts to narrow federal
court jurisdiction and various arguments to justify such action).
214. Doe, 486 U.S. at 611-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. See, e.g., Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1471 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that statute foreclosing judicial review of Veterans' Administration
actions concerning benefits did not preclude judicial review of constitutionality
of procedures employed); Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1987)
(indicating that Disaster Relief Act preclusion provision did not apply to claim
that regulation was unconstitutional); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100-01
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (deciding on facts very similar to Doe's that appellant could
challenge FBI hiring decision as unconstitutional, although the decision was
otherwise committed to agency discretion); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 699
(D.C. Cir.) (holding that doctrine of sovereign immunity does not permit Con-
gress to preclude all judicial review of constitutionality of enactment), rehear-
ing order vacated, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Paluca v. Secretary of Labor,
813 F.2d 524, 526 (1st Cir.) (holding that the district court has jurisdiction to
review constitutional challenges to the Secretary's compliance with FECA),
cert denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
216. But see Doe, 486 U.S. at 618-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
constitutional rights are not always more important to plaintiffs than statutory
rights).
217. See generally Note, supra note 127, at 791-95 (using balancing test to
defend the presumption).
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Court in Doe engaged in interest balancing to arrive at a partial
unreviewability holding.
For all these reasons, Justice O'Connor probably was right
in assuming that the Court's embrace of the "law to apply" test
was decidedly limited. Indeed, the Court could not possibly
have rested its unreviewability holding primarily on that test.
For, contrary to the Court's assumption,2 18 Doe had never
asked the courts to review the CIA's finding that his dismissal
was "necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States" within the meaning of section 102(c).219 Thus, the Chief
Justice's remarks about the open-endedness and un-
manageability of the statutory standard220 were addressed to
language that was not even in controversy. Doe's only statu-
tory argument, at least by the time he reached the Supreme
Court, was that the CIA Director had not furnished a "brief
statement of the grounds for [his dismissal]," as provided in sec-
tion 555(e) of the APA.2 21 Chief Justice Rehnquist could
scarcely have maintained that there was no "law to apply" to
that question. Yet, after Doe, a discharged CIA employee ap-
parently cannot obtain any judicial relief by invoking section
555(e).
A similar problem would have arisen if Doe had challenged
the Director's termination decision on a "pure" abuse of discre-
tion basis. For example, suppose a CIA agent, fired for homo-
sexuality, presented seemingly incontrovertible evidence to a
court that the charge was not true. One can think of reasons
not to allow such a claim to be litigated - the Director's rebut-
tal information might be too sensitive to disclose, or might
come from a confidential source, or might reveal the agency's
investigative methods - but the absence of "law to apply"
should be irrelevant, because the dispute over whether the ter-
mination was arbitrary would not revolve around the language
of section 102(c). Again, the language of the Doe opinion ap-
218. Doe, 486 U.S. at 600.
219. See Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1511, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1986), qff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). Doe's
amended complaint fleetingly mentioned § 102(c) in its jurisdictional allega-
tions, but otherwise bears out the statement made in text. See Joint Appendix
at 5, 12-13, Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
220. Doe, 486 U.S. at 600-01.
221. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1988). See Brief for Respondent at 5-8, Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). In addition to his APA claim, Doe pleaded violations
of the Constitution and of CIA regulations. The Supreme Court held that the
claim based on the regulations was not properly before it. Doe, 486 U.S. at 604
n.8.
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pears broad enough to foreclose such a challenge, yet the "law
to apply" reasoning does not readily support that result.
The Court's answer, to the extent any can be inferred, is
apparently that the National Security Act authorizes the Direc-
tor to fire CIA employees without explanation and for totally
irrational reasons. This implication, however, merely under-
scores what an unnatural reading of the statute the Court had
to adopt to make the "law to apply" argument even minimally
pertinent. One can imagine the surprise members of the intel-
ligence oversight committees of Congress would feel if they
took the CIA Director to task for a whimsical or uninformed
dismissal and the Director asserted that any such firing is en-
tirely lawful. The Court could have avoided this result if it had
been willing to say frankly that the statute does contain a
meaningful substantive standard and does rest upon customary
expectations of rationality and fair procedure, but that for pru-
dential reasons the courts should not enforce these obligations.
Doe thus exemplifies one of the perverse consequences of the
"law to apply" analysis. Insistence that courts must always en-
force "law" will not always broaden the domain of judicial re-
view; sometimes it will narrow the domain of "law."
The interesting question is why Chief Justice Rehnquist
approached the case through a "law to apply" analysis at all,
despite its inadequacies, some of which the dissent had demon-
strated.222 Certainly the weight of precedent - particularly
Chaney, which he himself had written - was a factor, but
probably not the only one. The "law to apply" approach also
enabled the Chief Justice to produce a narrow opinion that
seven participating Justices could endorse. Because his argu-
ments for precluding statutory claims from judicial review re-
volved entirely around inferences drawn from the National
Security Act, the opinion would not necessarily control cases
that might arise under any other statute. The price for this
near unanimity, however, was a rather implausible interpreta-
tion of congressional intent.
The delicacy of the issues and the difficulty of holding a
broad coalition together also probably account for the excep-
tional terseness of the Court's opinion. As a result of this brev-
ity, the Court left itself plenty of room to maneuver in future
cases. By the same token, the Court still is a long way from
settling the exact relationship between the "law to apply" test
and other methods of identifying actions that are "committed to
222. Doe, 486 U.S. at 606-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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agency discretion." One can anticipate, however, that Justice
Scalia's attack on the "law to apply" test will be influential, es-
pecially because it echoes an already loud chorus of lower court
judges who can barely conceal their skepticism about the value
of the test.2 23 If the courts are to abandon or modify the "law
to apply" test, however, they will need a credible alternative.
The following part of this Article undertakes to provide one.
III. BEYOND "LAW TO APPLY"
The preceding part of the Article shows that the Supreme
Court has made little headway in defining the boundaries of
section 701(a)(2). The Court could clarify its analysis by explic-
itly acknowledging what it is already doing implicitly: it should
cease treating the "law to apply" test as the exclusive standard
for identifying actions that are "committed to agency discre-
tion." Instead, the Court should candidly approach section
701(a)(2) as a source of authority for elaborating a "common
law of unreviewabiity."
A. THE FuTILITY OF "FUTILITY"
The Court's defense of the "law to apply" test rests primar-
ily on what I call the "futility" theory. This theory maintains
that an administrative action is unreviewable if and only if judi-
cial review of the decision would be infeasible.22 The difficul-
ties with the futility theory have been explored at length above
and require only a brief recapitulation.
On the most abstract level, the futility theory is intrinsi-
cally suspect because it renders the concept of unrevievability
superfluous: it assumes that the only unreviewable agency ac-
tions are ones that would survive review even if a court reached
223. See, e.g., Chong v. United States Information Agency, 821 F.2d 171,
175-76 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1987) (following "law to apply" approach but also reaf-
firming pre-Chaney precedents prescribing pragmatic analysis); Woodsmall v.
Lyng, 816 F.2d 1241, 1244-47 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting Chaney's nominal rejection
of the pragmatic considerations test and Chaney's critics, refusing to determine
Chaney's effect on pragmatic considerations approach, and holding FmHA's
evaluation of creditworthiness unreviewable because it was based on agency
expertise and because statute contained no meaningful standards for reviewing
agency's exercise of discretion); Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1548-49 & n.5
(7th Cir. 1985) (noting that "law to apply" test has been "severely criticized"
and reading Chaney "solely as reaffirming the recognized position that
§ 701(a)(2) applies in certain circumstances where courts are unqualified to de-
cide whether an agency has abused its discretion").
224. See Doe, 486 U.S. at 599-600; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830
(1985).
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the merits.2 25 Indeed, the theory is self-defeating because it
means that a court cannot find an agency action unreviewable
without thinking about the substance of the challenger's con-
tentions - that is, reviewing the action.
Second, the major premise of the futility theory - that ex-
tremely broad statutory language makes judicial review infeasi-
ble - is also mistaken. Even a broad statutory mandate, which
gives an agency wide latitude to strike a balance among varied
public policy factors, can have teeth when a litigant alleges that
the agency failed to take the prescribed factors into account.226
Furthermore, courts have devised a number of doctrines with
which they can test an agency action for arbitrariness without
relying on the statutory language under which the agency ac-
ted.227 Of course, one can find loosely reasoned decisions in
which courts have invoked section 701(a)(2) because they have
failed to perceive some of the ways in which agency action can
be statutorily unauthorized 22 8 or an abuse of discretion.229 The
225. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
226. See Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 508-09 (1983)
(considering effect of Rehabilitation Act on FCC's duty to regulate "in the
public interest"); id. at 513-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same); NAACP v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 666 (1976) (holding that the FPC's duty
to advance public interest does not include authority to proscribe discrimina-
tory employment practices).
227. See supra notes 88-91, 117-19 and accompanying text.
228. A series of cases arising under the Flood Control Act of 1944 is illus-
trative. The Act directs the Secretary of Interior to allocate excess electric
power among "preference" utilities "in such manner as to encourage the most
widespread use thereof." 16 U.S.C. § 825s (1988). Reading the statute at face
value, one would think that there might be any number of potential alloca-
tions of power that the Secretary could not reasonably defend as fostering the
"most widespread use." Yet several courts, without citing any evidence that
the statute has a broader scope than its language implies, have held that these
allocation decisions are unreviewable because the Act contains "no law to ap-
ply." E.g., Electricities of N.C., Inc. v. Southeastern Power Admin., 774 F.2d
1262, 1266 (4th Cir. 1985); Greenwood Utils. Conm'n v. Hodel, 764 F.2d 1459,
1464-65 (11th Cir. 1985); City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 668 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
229. For cases that appear to assume that a broad statutory mandate makes
abuse of discretion review impossible, see, e.g., Scalise v. Thornburgh, 891 F.2d
640 (7th Cir. 1989), revt Scalise v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1988),
cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1815 (1990); Florida Dep't of Business Regulation v. De-
partment of Interior, 768 F.2d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1985) (denying review
where Secretary was given broad power to acquire land for the benefit of an
Indian tribe), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986); South Delta Water Agency v.
United States, 767 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1985) (dictum); Greenwood Utils., 764
F.2d at 1464-65.
Scalise is particularly striking. In that case, two Americans convicted of
crimes in England requested the Attorney General to seek their transfer to a
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existence of these cases, however, merely suggests that the fu-
tility analysis breeds a carelessness that creates the potential
for misguided substantive results. In the long run, a theory of
unreviewabiity that rests on false assumptions about the power
of modern scope-of-review doctrine cannot be expected to
flourish.230
Conceivably, of course, one could oppose judicial review in
situations in which there is no, or very little, "law to apply,"
even while conceding that review is feasible in those situations.
A proponent of this position, however, would have to explain
why such situations are appropriate candidates for un-
reviewability. As already seen, the fragment of legislative his-
tory that the Court originally cited in Overton Park was utterly
inadequate to support the "law to apply" test.231 And the
courts have never attempted to defend the preclusion inherent
in the Overton Park test on any policy ground other than
'futility.'
The nearest that anyone has come to offering such an al-
ternative rationale is Professor Richard Pierce's analysis.232
Relying on Chaney's endorsement of the "law to apply" test,
Professor Pierce submits that courts should refuse to review all
questions arising under administrative statutes that he calls
"meaningless," such as provisions authorizing an agency to reg-
ulate "in the public interest" or to set "just and reasonable"
prison in the United States. The Attorney General refused. The district court
found the refusal arbitrary and capricious, in part because this action had devi-
ated from past practice without explanation and because there was no eviden-
tiary support for the Attorney General's findings. 687 F. Supp. at 1246. The
court's rationales, of course, did not depend on the terms of the statute under
which the Attorney General had acted. Even with the district court's opinion
squarely before it, however, the court of appeals held the decision unreview-
able because of the "absence of any [statutory] standards upon which this
court could review the Attorney General's discretionary authority." 891 F.2d
at 648.
230. It might be argued that the erroneous applications of § 701(a)(2) de-
scribed in the text do no harm, because when a court is unable to perceive any
basis for questioning a given agency action, the government is destined to pre-
vail anyway. Once a category of agency actions has been held "unreviewable,"
however, litigants in future cases may refrain from challenging those actions;
courts may feel that precedent constrains them from reaching the merits of
such actions; and the agency that takes such actions may be tempted to behave
irresponsibly. Moreover, incorrect doctrinal analysis in a circuit's case law can
mislead the court as it confronts agency actions arising in wholly unrelated
contexts.
231. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
232. Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Adminis-
trative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 513-20 (1985).
[Vol. 74:689
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
rates.233 His justification for this proposal is that administrative
agencies are more politically accountable than courts.23 Ac-
cording to Pierce, if courts openly announced that the Presi-
dent must bear complete responsibility for any policy decision
as to which Congress has not provided specific guidance, both
elected branches would feel "pressure" to become more actively
involved in supervising agency decisionmaking. 23 5
Professor Pierce's argument contains a number of debata-
ble assumptions, 236 but for present purposes the main question
is whether he makes a persuasive case for using a reviewability
standard analogous to the "law to apply" test. Certainly his de-
sire to leave important policy decisions to politically accounta-
ble actors, rather than to unelected judges, is a valid goal. This
goal, however, is also implicated in cases in which, although
Congress has given some guidance, an alleged ambiguity in the
statute gives rise to a dispute between an agency and a private
party. Pierce recognizes this connection in his approving dis-
cussion of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,237 which involved a statutory standard that he
does not regard as "meaningless."23s In other words, Pierce's
political accountability rationale always militates against judi-
cial review, except where a statute is essentially unambiguous.
Even Professor Pierce does not seem ready for so drastic an
abandonment of judicial review;s 9 yet he fails to explain why
the need for political accountability is more pressing in cases
arising under "meaningless" statutes than in cases arising
under statutes that are "meaningful" but nevertheless ambigu-
ous. In this sense, his analysis does not provide a satisfying rea-
son for making the applicability of section 701(a)(2) turn on
whether or not the statute is "meaningless" - nor, by exten-
sion, on whether or not there is "law to apply." It offers no log-
233. See id, at 474-78 (cataloguing "meaningless" statutes).
234. Id. at 520-21.
235. See id. at 521-24.
236. See Levin, Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review, and the
Gloomy World of Judge Smith, 1986 DuKE L.J. 258, 269-70 (questioning
whether curtailment of judicial review actually would induce Congress to
write more specific legislation); cf Bunn, Irwin & Sido, No Regulation With-
out Representation: Would Judicial Enforcement of a Stricter Nondelegation
Doctrine Limit Administrative Lawmaking?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 341, 368-77
(suggesting, on the basis of a state-level case study, that a revitalized nondele-
gation doctrine would do little to encourage specificity in legislative drafting).
237. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), discussed in Pierce, supra note 232, at 494-95, 505-
07.
238. See Pierce, supra note 232, at 494.
239. See id. at 514.
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ical stopping point that would enable courts to distinguish
between agency actions that should be unreviewable and
agency actions that should be examined under normal (if defer-
ential) standards of review.2 0
Of course, lower courts would have to follow the "law to
apply" approach to section 701(a)(2) if Supreme Court prece-
dents clearly mandated the test. Despite its lip service to the
futility theory, however, the Court has never relied solely on
that rationale to hold an 'agency action unreviewable. Both
Chaney and Doe seemed to stress the absence of "law to ap-
ply,"2 4 1 but a close study of the opinions reveals that the
Court's reliance was partial and inconclusive.2M Moreover, in
BLE the Court ignored the Overton Park test and invoked sec-
tion 701(a)(2) in a case in which there certainly was "law to
apply. '243
Why has the Court been so reluctant to discard an inter-
pretation of section 701(a)(2) that embodies such a thoroughly
unsupported distinction between the reviewable and the unre-
viewable? For one thing, the Court probably continues to be-
lieve in the Overton Park teaching that section 701(a)(2) should
remain "very narrow." The "law to apply" test does tend to
achieve that end, albeit crudely. In addition, part of the expla-
nation may lie in the Court's sensitivity to the charge of "judi-
cial lawmaking." Hesitation about usurping what is even
arguably the province of Congress has been a hallmark of the
240. In any event, the Pierce proposal seems too sweeping and inflexible to
be defended solely on the basis of political accountability. For one thing, it ap-
parently would foreclose judicial review when agencies with "meaningless"
mandates issue adjudicative orders, such as FTC cease and desist orders and
FCC license renewals and revocations. Yet presidential supervision of agency
adjudication is uncommon and would be widely considered undesirable. See
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 & n.527 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that
"there is no inherent executive power to control the rights of individuals in
[adjudicative] settings"). As regards many policy decisions, moreover, the like-
lihood that the President would suffer political reprisals if his administration
made the wrong choice seems infinitesimal. Cf Conservative Era, supra note
123, at 391 (remarks of Alan Morrison) (asking, "how many people in the
world do you think are going to decide whom to vote for in 1988 based upon
whether the Food and Drug Administration went after drugs or not in Heckler
v. Chaney?"). In these contexts, the argument that the need to enhance the
President's accountability outweighs any of the potential benefits of judicial
review loses much of its force.
241. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing Chaney);
notes 190-92 and accompanying text (discussing Doe).
242. See supra notes 121-43 and accompanying text (analyzing Chaney);
notes 200-17 and accompanying text (analyzing Doe).
243. See supra notes 159, 168-69 and accompanying text.
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Burger and Rehnquist years.2A4 Thus the Court disables itself
from developing a coherent unreviewability doctrine, by sug-
gesting that it must leave the entire job to Congress.245
Curiously, however, in the related area of statutory preclu-
sion of judicial review, the Court has been developing what
might be considered a "common law of preclusion." A critical
reading of recent case law under section 701(a)(1) of the APA,
which gives effect to statutory preclusion provisions,246 indi-
cates that the Court tends to allow some issues to be precluded
more readily than other issues. At the top of the scale, as Doe
illustrates, the presumption against preclusion of constitutional
grievances against an agency is practically irrebuttable.2 47 The
Court also has proved less willing to find preclusion in cases in-
volving administrative rules than in cases involving agency ad-
judication,248 and less willing to foreclose legal challenges than
factual ones,249 especially where the legal issues are not within
the administering agency's expertise.2so At the bottom of the
244. For a few random examples of this pervasive theme, see City of Mil-
waukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-17 (1981) (restricting federal common law
of nuisance); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 575-78 (1979)
(revising test for implied private causes of action, so that focus is on congres-
sional intent); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-48 (1978) (holding that courts have no
federal common law power to impose procedures on administrative agencies);
Note, Intent Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 894-98 (1982) (tracing drift
towards literalism in statutory construction).
245. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (stating that "we es-
sentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the decision as to whether
an agency's refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially reviewable").
246. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1988).
247. In addition to Doe, see, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (stating that a serious constitutional
issue would arise if preclusion provision were read to deny a judicial forum for
constitutional claims); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974) (holding
that the prohibition of judicial review of Veterans' Administration decisions
does not preclude judicial review of constitutional challenges to veterans' ben-
efits legislation); supra note 215 (citing lower court cases).
248. Compare Michigan Academy, 476 U.S. at 674-78 (concluding that pro-
vision in Part B of the Medicare Act permits review of regulations) with
United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 206-11 (1982) (holding that the same
provision forbids review of individual benefit determinations).
249. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978)
(permitting ultra vires review of Clean Air Act regulations after statutory
deadline, but not arbitrariness review). In the Veterans' Judicial Review Act,
Congress heeded this distinction: it expressly authorized judicial review of
legal issues while forbidding review of factual and law-applying issues. See
supra note 5.
250. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 541-45 (1988) (holding that statu-
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hierarchy are issues of fact and application of law to fact, which
the Court allows to be precluded more readily than any
others.251
In most of these cases, the Court also found technical
grounds for reading the statutes to support these results; thus
the Court's lawmaking was peripheral and somewhat covert.
Yet these holdings clearly have been informed by practical
judgments about the relative importance of judicial review of
various kinds of issues.252 One would have been astonished if
the Court had adopted any of the opposite distinctions - for
example, if it had made factual contentions reviewable in a sit-
uation in which legal issues were unreviewable.
Thus the great irony of the Supreme Court's reviewability
doctrine: the Court has engaged in obvious, if unacknowledged,
lawmaking in cases arising under section 701(a)(1), where theo-
retically it is merely uncovering the will of Congress; but the
Court disclaims a lawmaking role in cases arising under section
701(a)(2), which by its very nature is an open invitation to judi-
cial creativity. The following section proposes a mode of analy-
sis that would bring these two bodies of precedents into closer
harmony with each other.
B. A COMMON LAW OF UNREVIEWABILITY
The elevation of Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court may
prove to have been a crucial turning point in the development
of section 701(a)(2). Justice Scalia's opinions in BLE and Doe
suggest that courts should be creative in identifying appropriate
cases for unreviewability, drawing upon "the 'common law' of
judicial review. '253 My position is that, whatever one thinks of
the results that Justice Scalia favored in those two cases, the
tory bar to review of Veterans' Administrator's decisions on questions of law
or fact under any law administered by the VA did not foreclose review of alle-
gation that VA regulation violated Rehabilitation Act).
251. See Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 791
(1985) (holding that civil servants may appeal denials of disability benefits on
legal and procedural grounds but not on factual grounds).
252. See generally infra Part III. B. 3.
253. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608-09 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). This represents a
change in Justice Scalia's view; earlier he had denounced the D.C. Circuit's de-
partures from the "law to apply" test. See supra note 107 and accompanying
text. Perhaps his change of heart occurred on the day when he found himself
both condemning and using pragmatic analysis in the course of a single para-
graph! See California Human Dev. Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1052 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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manner in which he analyzed section 701(a)(2) was essentially
correct. The Supreme Court should acknowledge the common
law role that it, in any event, obviously feels impelled to play.
It could do so by replacing the formalistic Overton Park analy-
sis with a pragmatic approach to section 701(a)(2).
Under such an analysis, a court could legitimately consider
a wide variety of historical, utilitarian, and prudential argu-
ments in deciding whether to refrain from judicial review in a
given case. Of course, individual judges should not have unfet-
tered discretion to accept or reject any administrative case
presented to the courts. The Supreme Court, and to a lesser
extent lower courts, could establish case law rules declaring a
broad class of agency actions unreviewable. Or, at times, the
courts might prefer to resort, as the Supreme Court did in Cza-
ney, to the weaker device of a "presumption,"255 which implies
that courts in subsequentcases may sometimes make reasoned
departures from the general rule.256 At still other times, a
court might find the accepted rules and presumptions un-
helpful and, therefore, embark on a fresh examination of com-
peting policy issues.2 57 Over time, various aspects of the law of
unreviewability probably would fluctuate between rule and ad
hoe decisions, as often occurs in subject areas governed by the
common law.25 8
It would be unrealistic to suppose that we could predict
with any specificity where the pragmatic approach would lead.
Based on the existing case law under section 701(a)(2), how-
ever, one may expect that this approach to the "committed to
agency discretion" doctrine would: 1) remain narrow in its
scope; 2) usually be invoked in certain peripheral areas of ad-
254. Although jurisprudential issues are largely beyond the scope of this
Article, the mode of reasoning envisioned here is roughly similar to the philos-
ophy of "legal pragmatism" or "practical reason" espoused by Daniel Farber
and Philip Frickey. See Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72
MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1341-49 (1988); Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the
First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1639-56 (1987). For a critical review
of the developing "practical reason" literature, see Feinman, Practical Legal
Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REV. 724 (1988).
255. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
256. See Schauer, supra note 94, at 544-48 (envisioning a model of "pre-
sumptive formalism").
257. See Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 623 n.10
(D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987), discussed infra
notes 441-45 and accompanying text.
258. Cf. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-9 (1947)
(describing characteristic rise and fall of common law rules).
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ministrative action; and 3) shield legal issues from judicial scru-
tiny less often than factual and discretionary issues.
1. Narrow Application
In the unreviewability law of the future, the scope of the
"committed to agency discretion" doctrine is likely to remain
very limited. Abbott Laboratories, with its presumption in favor
of the availability of judicial review,2 9 is a well entrenched pre-
cedent 260 that reflects widely held convictions about the value
of judicial review in our system of government. A standard ac-
count of the contributions of judicial review would read some-
thing like this: Scrutiny of administrative action by an
independent judiciary is an integral part of the American
checks and balances system - a powerful deterrent to abuses
of power and an effective remedy when abuses occur.261 By
helping maintain public confidence that government officials
remain subject to the rule of law, judicial review also bolsters
the legitimacy of agency action.2 62 The courts' supervision of
agency action complements the oversight activities of political
actors, who often have parochial interests at heart or are inac-
cessible, as a practical matter, to some victims of regulatory ac-
tion or inaction.2 63 Finally, judicial review can enhance the
quality of administrative action by exposing partiality, careless-
ness, and perverseness in agencies' reasoning.2 6
In its recent statutory preclusion cases, however, the
Supreme Court has stressed that the Abbott Laboratories pre-
259. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967), discussed
supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
260. For a full discussion, see Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Phy-
sicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670-73 (1986).
261. See, e.g., Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 937-38 (1988) (discussing the values implicit
in the Constitution's separation of powers); Sunstein, supra note 52, at 655-56
(discussing the importance of judicial review in the administrative agency con-
text); Note, supra note 127, at 785-88 (discussing the role of judicial review in
maintaining separation of powers).
262. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 320 (stating that judicial review is
"the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of admin-
istrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid"); Fallon,
supra note 261, at 942 (noting that "Congress frequently provides for judicial
review in part to secure an imprimatur of legitimacy for administrative
action").
263. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 236, at 271-74 (discussing the interplay be-
tween judicial review and the democratic process).
264. See Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE
L.J. 38, 60 (1975) (describing beneficial effects of intensive judicial review of
technically complex regulations).
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sumption can be rebutted where a congressional intent to fore-
close review is "fairly discernible. '265 By analogy, under the
pragmatic approach to section 701(a)(2), the presumption likely
will give way where the courts find sufficiently strong practical
reasons to exercise self-restraint.
2. Kinds of Unreviewable Actions
Predicting the circumstances that would trigger application
of section 701(a)(2) under a pragmatic approach is a highly
speculative undertaking. The scholarly literature on the sub-
ject is exceedingly sparse. There is, of course, a burgeoning
literature on the shortcomings of judicial review.266 In general,
however, these critiques, even if accepted at face value, do not
seem readily adaptable to the effort to define the scope of the
"committed to agency discretion" doctrine. For example, Pro-
fessor Mashaw has mounted a powerful and widely noticed at-
tack on judicial review of Social Security disability benefits
decisions.267 Claimants who have been denied disability bene-
fits, however, have an explicit statutory right to judicial re-
view;268 abandonment of this judicial function would manifestly
require legislative action. On another front, a growing body of
scholarship suggests that agencies often refrain from launching
worthwhile rulemaking proceedings because they are reluctant
to generate the detailed explanatory statement and comprehen-
sive factual record needed to satisfy a rigorous judicial "hard
look. '26 9 This critique may indicate that courts should become
more deferential when reviewing agency policymaking in tech-
nically sophisticated subject areas, but probably no one would
seriously suggest that courts should treat all such policymaking
as "committed to agency discretion."2 70
265. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984).
266. See articles cited supra note 2.
267. J. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983). Mashaw argues that
courts' intervention in that realm does little to upgrade the overall quality of
the disability system. Id. at 185-90. At the same time, it fosters inequality, be-
cause claimants who file appeals tend to win benefits, while many other
equally deserving claimants will acquiesce in a denial of benefits because they
lack the stamina and resources to litigate. See id. at 138-39.
268. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
269. See Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 AD-
MIN. L. REv. 363, 391-93 & n.93 (1986); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 2, at 294-
99; Pierce, supra note 2, at 309-13.
270. Congress's demonstrable desire for a continuation of the judicial hard
look in some of these areas would again be a major objection to such an aban-
donment of judicial review. See, e.g., National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d
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Next let us consider whether the case law provides more
direction. Some courts have tried to resolve reviewability ques-
tions with balancig tests. Under the best known formula,
originated by the First Circuit in Hahn v. Gottlieb 271 and used
by other courts up until the time of Chaney,272 availability of
judicial review should depend on three factors: "first, the ap-
propriateness of the issues raised for review by the courts; sec-
ond, the need for judicial supervision to safeguard the interests
of the plaintiffs; and third, the impact of review on the effec-
tiveness of the agency in carrying out its assigned role."273 The
Hahn formula is roughly consistent with the pragmatic analysis
under discussion here. Such a formula, however, is obviously
too general and all-embracing to offer courts very much mean-
ingful direction. Like Abbott Laboratories, Hahn furnishes a
starting point for analysis, not a self-sufficient guideline.
Cases with a narrower focus may also be illuminating. Pos-
sibly the most reliable way to project the future of the common
law of unreviewability is to examine several categories of
agency actions that have been held unreviewable under section
701(a)(2) in the recent past.274 One group of cases involves
agency actions arising from unusually sensitive subject areas.
Actions relating to foreign policy, military, and national secur-
ity affairs are among the strongest candidates for being consid-
ered "committed to agency discretion."275 Courts simply do not
give these matters the same kind of "hard look" that domestic
policy decisions routinely receive. This self-restraint rests on
416, 452 n.127 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting legislative history of 1977 Clean Air
Act amendments).
271. 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970); see supra Part II. A.
272. Intercity Transp. Co. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103, 107 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1044
(D.C. Cir. 1979). For a minor variation, see Woodsmall v. Lyng, 816 F.2d 1241,
1243-46 (8th Cir. 1987) (looking to "(1) whether the challenged action is of the
type Congress intended be left to a reasonable exercise of agency expertise;
and (2) whether the problem raised is one suitable for judicial determination"
(quoting Tuepker v. FmHA, 708 F.2d 1329, 1332 (8th Cir. 1983)).
273. Hahn, 430 F.2d at 1249.
274. For overviews of the § 701(a)(2) case law, see 5 K. DAVIS, supra note
32, §§ 28:6-:9; J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 50, at 698-706.
275. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding de-
nial of visa to alien unreviewable if a facially legitimate and bona fide reason
was given to applicant); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (stating
that the Executive's decision regarding recognition of foreign governments is
conclusive in the courts); Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212, 1213-14 (5th Cir.
1987) (following Mandel), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); Khalsa v. Wein-
berger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1398-1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that military appear-
ance regulations are not reviewable).
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policies similar to those underlying the political question doc-
trine:276 the courts' lack of information about foreign affairs,
the confidentiality of much of that information, and the need to
m inimie the incoherence that results when American foreign
policy is articulated by multiple voices. The desire to curtail ju-
dicial involvement in delicate subject areas also extends to cer-
tain corners of the domestic realm.277 For example, the
Federal Reserve Board's regulation of the nation's money sup-
ply has long been regarded as a function that courts could not
possibly supervise effectively; therefore, they decline to attempt
review. 278
Another group of cases concerns informal, unstructured
agency operations that are closely related to the agency's man-
agement of its workload and may not reflect conclusions on the
merits of the petitioner's substantive claims. Such agency deci-
sions frequently are made on grounds that courts cannot easily
evaluate in a constructive way. Chaney and BLE exemplify this
category. In adopting a limited bar to review of administrative
prosecutorial discretion, Chaney relied on the abstract quality
of the issues presented and on the problems inherent in judicial
attempts to supervise agencies' resource allocation decisions.21 9
In BLE, similarly, the Court was concerned about the practical
problems presented by review of agency denials of reconsidera-
tion. Because agencies often fail to explain such denials (and
the BLE Court was unwilling to impose a duty of explanation),
judicial efforts to scrutinize their reasoning could be futile.28 0
Moreover, precluding judicial review would encourage parties
to make all of their arguments during the initial round of litiga-
tion, thus furthering the legal system's interest in finality of
276. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13, 217 (1962); Smith v. Rea-
gan, 844 F.2d 195, 198 (4th Cir.) (holding that suit challenging government's ef-
forts to locate missing prisoners of war in Vietnam was nonjusticiable), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988).
277. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding FBI
personnel decisions unreviewable except on constitutional grounds).
278. See Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 559 F.2d 863, 868-
69 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978); Raichle v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 915-16 (2d Cir. 1929). But cf Independent Bankers Ass'n v.
Board of Governors, 500 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (following Abbott Laborato-
ries and holding that Board regulation concerning check-clearing practices was
subject to review). Restrictive application of standing principles has but-
tressed the Fed's substantial immunity from judicial supervision. E.g., Reuss v.
Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
279. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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decisionmaking.281
Finally, courts likely will hold unreviewability appropriate
when the petitioner challenges a phase of administrative activ-
ity that does not directly affect private interests.2 2 An instruc-
tive case in this category is Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Hodel.2 83 There, a statute required the Secretary of Inte-
rior to submit a report to Congress explaining "in detail" why
he had rejected certain proposals concerning offshore oil and
gas leasing.284 The state of California asked the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit to review whether the Secretary's response had
been sufficiently "detailed. ' '285 The court refused, observing
that the "agency action" at issue was entirely unlike the
rulemaking and adjudicative functions that courts normally re-
view, and that the presumption of reviewability was "woefully
inapposite" in this context.286
3. Partial Unreviewability
Another likely element of a pragmatic approach to section
701(a)(2) would be liberal use of the concept of partial un-
reviewability.287 Thus, much as they have done in statutory
preclusion cases,288 courts applying section 701(a)(2) probably
would treat many agency actions as reviewable on some
grounds but not on others. Judges already tend to assume that
agency actions that are to some extent "committed to agency
discretion" remain reviewable for compliance with the Consti-
tution.28 9 A similar but broader principle would be that certain
agency actions may be challenged on legal grounds, but not on
abuse of discretion grounds. The cases show some support for
this proposition;290 indeed, it obviously bears some relationship
281. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
282. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (concluding that agency's failure to prepare impact statement for
White House use, as required by Executive Order, is no basis for reversal).
283. 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
284. Id. at 316.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 316-19; cf. Industrial Safety Equip. Ass'n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115,
1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that report issued for educational purposes was
not "agency action" within the meaning of the APA, and thus was not subject
to judicial review); American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 755 F.2d 1292,
1296-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
287. For an explanation of this concept, see supra notes 54-56 and accompa-
nying text.
288. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
290. See infra Part IV. A. In cases involving foreign affairs, the political
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to the prevailing "law to apply" theory. Before discussing that
relationship more fully, it will be useful to explore why a prag-
matic analysis could support reviewing certain agency actions
solely on the basis of "law."
There can be several justifications for such a rule of partial
unreviewability. First, courts traditionally have been regarded
as the "final authorities" in interpreting statutory commands
and other legal mandates;2 91 their competence and legitimacy in
that realm is widely accepted. When courts review factual and
discretionary determinations, however, they confront issues on
which the agency often has superior expertise and experi-
ence.292 Indeed, even when unreviewability is not involved, a
reviewing court generally examines an agency's factual and dis-
cretionary conclusions only to determine whether they are ra-
tional, not whether they are correct.2 93 Accordingly, a decision
not to exercise this judicial function has less tendency to sub-
vert the principle of checks and balances than a refusal to re-
view an agency's legal interpretations.294
Second, when a court resolves a legal issue, it characteristi-
cally writes an opinion interpreting the relevant statute or reg-
ulations; that decision provides lasting guidance to the agency
and the public. A judicial opinion deciding whether an agency
acted arbitrarily, when no explicit legal issues are raised, has
question doctrine generally does not foreclose review based on alleged errors
of law. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S.
221, 230 (1986) (stating that the Court cannot shirk its responsibility to inter-
pret statutes merely because the decision may have political overtones);
Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445, 461-63 (8th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (holding that
military decisions regarding deployment of MX missiles are reviewable for
compliance with NEPA); South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 123
(D.C. Cir.) (holding that court may review propriety of order revoking permit
of South African air carrier pursuant to Anti-Apartheid Act), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 896 (1987); DKT Memorial Fund, Ltd., v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 810 F.2d
1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1068-
70 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
291. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978); Levin, Identify-
ing Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 16-18 (1985).
292. See Breyer, supra note 269, at 394.
293. See Levin, supra note 27, at 253-60.
294. See Note, supra note 127, at 793. This is not to say that review of fact
findings makes no contribution to separation of powers values. See Fallon,
supra note 261, at 987-88; cf Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of
"Some Evidence," 25 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 631, 679-713 (1988) (defending judicial
scrutiny of whether agency actions rest on "some evidence"). Thus, this dis-
tinction is basically one of degree.
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more limited precedential value.295 In an era when docket
pressures weigh heavily on the federal judiciary,29 6 the desire
to make efficient use of judicial resources bolsters the case for
foreclosing appeals that add to the courts' workload without
contributing proportionately to the growth of the substantive
law.
2 9 7
Third, review of factual and discretionary issues imposes
certain tangible costs on agencies that review of legal issues
does not. When the reasoning underlying an agency's exercise
of discretion is subject to judicial review, the agency has to fur-
nish a written opinion; when factual premises are subject to re-
view, the agency has to compile a record.2 98 Thus, the threat of
295. This comparison between the precedential effects of legal review and
abuse of discretion review cuts two ways, as Professor Strauss has recently
pointed out: if the court's legal interpretation is ill-advised, it may do more
harm than a ruling on an individualized act of discretion. See Strauss, supra
note 2, at 1131. He suggests that this danger helps to explain why the
Supreme Court has recently been pressing the lower courts to defer to agen-
cies' statutory interpretations, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984), even as it also has ratified the
use of a "hard look" in abuse of discretion review, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44 (1983). See Strauss, supra
note 2, at 1129-31. One might accept Strauss's point as a reason for courts to be
cautious before overturning agencies' statutory interpretations; but he does not
press it to the counterintuitive extreme of suggesting that courts should some-
times engage in abuse of discretion review of an agency action while entirely
ignoring claims that the agency exceeded its statutory authority.
296. See, e.g., FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY COMMITrEE, REPORT 4-9 (1990) (de-
ploring the results of the federal courts' caseload "crisis"); Markey, On the
Present Deterioration of the Federal Appellate Process: Never Another
Learned Hand, 33 S.D.L. REv. 371, 377 (1988).
297. See Fallon, supra note 261, at 987; Note, supra note 127, at 792-93. In
opposing legislation to permit judicial review of veterans' benefits decisions,
Judges Morris Arnold and Stephen Breyer, speaking for the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, stressed competing claims on judges' time, the judi-
ciary's lack of expertise on the technical issues involved, and the loss of
uniformity that would result if a single agency's decisions were subject to re-
view by courts scattered across the country. Judicial Review of Veterans' Af-
fairs: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 202-03, 214-17 (1988). They did not oppose judicial review of constitu-
tional questions and questions of statutory interpretation, however: "that fun-
damental duty is one the courts will always perform, regardless of the
burden." Id. at 214.
298. An especially costly form of judicial review, from an agency's point of
view, is an enforcement proceeding in which a private party challenges a rule
that has long been in force. Often, by the time the agency starts preparing to
defend the rule, the record is stale, and the staff that wrote the rule has scat-
tered. To ameliorate this problem, some authorities favor imposing strict time
limits on the right to challenge certain agency rules as unsupported by the rec-
ord. See Recommendation No. 82-7 of the Admin. Conf. of the United States, 1
C.F.R. § 305.82-7 (1989); Verkuil, supra note 5, at 771-75. As these authorities
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judicial review encourages greater formality in administrative
decisionmaking.2 9 9 Administrative decisions that for policy rea-
sons should remain extremely informal might, therefore, be ex-
empted from the full power of "hard look" review. Such logic,
however, allows for judicial review that does not indirectly
shape the agency's procedures - for example, review to deter-
mine whether the action on its face exceeds the agency's statu-
tory authority.
Besides providing a rationale for one type of partial un-
reviewability, these practical distinctions between legal and fac-
tual issues suggest an attractive way to reconcile the formalist
and pragmatic approaches to section 701(a)(2). Many authori-
ties speak as though the "law to apply" test and a pragmatic ap-
proach are mutually exclusive,3 0 0 but this is not necessarily so.
A better view is the one that prevailed before Overton Park:
the presence or absence of "law to apply" is one relevantfactor
that courts should weigh along with others in the pragmatic
calculus.3 0 1 This is the way in which the "law to apply" ap-
proach was actually used in Chaney30 2 and Doe,3 03 notwith-
standing the Court's lip service to a futility approach.
Specifically, the presence of law against which the court
can judge the plaintiff's claims should usually be a sufficient
reason to permit judicial review of those claims; thus, the Over-
ton Park analysis should control most cases. Nevertheless,
courts should recognize the possibility that, in a relatively small
number of cases, countervailing considerations will dictate that
a claim of legal error should remain unadjudicated. 30 4 On the
recognize, however, claims that a rule exceeds the agency's statutory authority
do not present the same practical problem, and the case for allowing delayed
challenges to the rule on this ground is accordingly stronger. Cf NLRB Union
v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 834 F.2d 191, 195-97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (con-
struing statute of limitations to reflect this distinction).
299. The judicially imposed requirement of a rulemaking record, for exam-
ple, has greatly changed the nature of agency rulemaking. See, e.g., DeLong,
Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV.
257, 262-67 (1979); Shapiro, APA: Past Presen Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 477-
78 (1986).
300. See, e.g., Woodsmall v. Lyng, 816 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (8th Cir. 1987);
Chaney v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 1030, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing), rev'd, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Fallon, supra note 261, at
980 n.349.
301. See Saferstein, supra note 63, at 380-82.
302. See supra Part II. C. 2.
303. See supra notes 200-17 and accompanying text.
304. The legal system's interest in finality might support this result. See
supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (discussing BLE); see also supra
text accompanying notes 221-22 (suggesting that Doe opinion would have been
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other hand, the absence of "law to apply" should militate to
some degree against judicial review. Because abuse of discre-
tion review remains feasible in such a case, however, the court
should continue to weigh arguments for and against review
before it decides how far, if at all, the action is "committed to
agency discretion."
Distinguishing between legal and nonlegal issues is not, of
course, the only approach to partial unreviewability worth con-
sidering. Under one alternative version, a court would explore
not only whether the agency had correctly understood its legal
authority, but also whether the agency had a facially plausible
basis for its application of the law to the facts of an individual
case. The Supreme Court adopted this approach, in effect, in
Dunlop v. Bachowski.30 5 This model would differ from full re-
viewability in that a court would not examine evidence to de-
termine whether the agency's factual premises were supported;
thus, the agency would not have to compile a record. This ap-
proach would, however, hold an agency to a slightly higher
level of responsibility than if the court reviewed for legal error
alone: the agency would have to know the law and be conscien-
tious in addressing the private party's particular grievance. 3°6
C. THE PERILS OF PRAGMATISM
The reader perhaps has begun to suspect that the prag-
matic approach to section 701(a)(2) is too vague and indetermi-
nate to be useful. The approach does indeed place a great deal
of trust in the courts' ability to muddle their way through un-
reviewability issues with scarcely any fixed reference points.
This indeterminacy, however, should be primarily a short-run
phenomenon. As already explained,3 0 7 nothing in the nature of
the pragmatic approach would prevent courts from generating
rules and presumptions specifying categories of situations that
more persuasive if Court had ruled that the CIA was bound by "law" that the
judiciary should not enforce).
305. 421 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1975). The Court purported to be interpreting the
standard of review prescribed by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982). Outside the LMRDA context,
the Dunlop standard has seldom been followed. For comprehensive discus-
sion, see Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 809-15 (D.C. Cir.
1987), vacated on rehearing, 846 F.2d 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1988); id. at 820-26 (Bork,
J., dissenting).
306. See Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing Labor De-
partment on the basis of Dunop); Shelley v. Brock, 793 F.2d 1368, 1372-75
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).
307. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
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should or should not be reviewable. 308 Over time, application of
the "committed to agency discretion" doctrine could become
progressively more manageable and predictable.
A more significant question to raise about the Article's pro-
posal is substantive: whether the pragmatic approach presents
unacceptable risks of misuse. Some observers might fear that
the pragmatic analysis would lead to repeated and damaging as-
saults on the institution of judicial review - a disembowelment
of the Abbott Laboratories principle.30 9 The BLE case, which
reached a highly debatable application of section 701(a)(2) in a
disturbingly casual fashion,310 may be a good illustration of this
risk.
Others might suggest that the proposed approach would re-
sult in too much review. A sophisticated version of this argu-
ment might proceed as follows: Lower court judges tend to
focus on the immediate potential benefits of judicial review in
an administrative appeal; moreover, they typically assume that
they will not misuse their power if they reach the merits of the
agency's decision.311 The Supreme Court, on the other hand,
with its discretionary jurisdiction, can take a more global, de-
tached view of reviewability issues; it is more likely and better
able to consider the possible long-run institutional costs of judi-
cial review. Over the long run, therefore, one should expect
the Supreme Court to be more receptive to unreviewability
claims than the lower courts. 312 If the Court gave an explicit
308. In principle, threshold jurisdictional issues should be easy to adminis-
ter, so that parties will not have to engage in expensive, exhausting battles
that merely determine whether a court will reach the merits of the plaintiff's
claims. For example, the Supreme Court's case law on standing has been co-
gently criticized for unnecessarily complicating administrative law with diffi-
cult questions of causation and redressability. See, e.g., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO
& P. VERKUIL, supra note 58, § 5.4.7, at 161. The major problem in the stand-
ing cases, however, is that the central issues are factual and thus must be ex-
amined anew in each individual case. In contrast, arguments about the scope
of the "committed to agency discretion" doctrine have usually turned on legal
issues; if courts wish to simplify the doctrine, they certainly can develop
bright-line rules that will have this effect.
309. Sunstein, supra note 53, at 478 & n.269; Note, supra note 113, at 1257.
310. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
311. See Christie, supra note 76, at 764 (stating that "[i]f we are uneasy
about [discretionary] choices made by [others], we usually have no such qualms
about the choices that we ourselves make. We almost inevitably seek to in-
crease our freedom of action, that is to increase the ambit of our 'discretion,'
rather than subject ourselves to 'artificial restraints' "); see also Shapiro, supra
note 299, at 476-80 (discussing development of modern scope-of-review doctrine
as a reflection of judges' social philosophies).
312. One should expect exceptions to this generalization: witness statutory
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blessing to the flexible common law approach to section
701(a)(2), however, lower courts would continually resort to in-
terest-balancing arguments to whittle away at the Court's
precedents upholding government claims of unreviewabiity.313
The Court, because of well-known limitations on its caseload,
could not as a practical matter police these excursions. 314
Therefore, the argument might conclude, the Supreme Court
should continue to demand adherence to the formal, "law to ap-
ply" approach to section 701(a)(2), because bright-line rules are
the most effective means to minimize the maneuvering of lower
court judges over time.315
These objections are plausible, and the final part of this
Article responds to them. In order to avoid speculating about
these concerns in the abstract, however, the next part offers a
case study that puts both the advantages and risks of the prag-
matic approach to the test of experience.
IV. VARIATIONS ON CHANEY: AGENCY INACTION
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court's opinion in Heckler v.
Chaney316 conspicuously left open a variety of questions about
the reviewability of administrative inaction. To be sure, the
main points in Chaney were clear: nonenforcement decisions
were presumptively unreviewable, but the presumption could
be overcome by statutory standards restricting the agency's en-
preclusion cases in which the Court has intervened on the side of reviewabil-
ity, such as Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 791
(1985), and Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978).
Even if one rejects the generalization entirely, however, it is clear that the
present Supreme Court looks more favorably upon § 701(a)(2) claims than do
the district courts and courts of appeals.
313. See Conservative Era, supra note 123, at 382 (remarks of Assistant At-
torney General Willard) (accusing D.C. Circuit of using "practical and func-
tional approaches... to evade the clear [formalist] teachings of their superior
court"). The inspiration for this charge was Professor (now Justice) Scalia's
analysis of the D.C. Circuit's evasion of Supreme Court jurisprudence on ad-
ministrative procedure in the 1970s. See id at 381 (citing Scalia, Vermont Yan-
kee" The APA, the D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV.
345).
314. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 1096-1100.
315. See id. at 1095, 1117 (suggesting that at times "the Court's opinions on
the merits may be influenced by its management dilemmas. It may choose
outcomes that tend to make its control over the appellate courts more effec-
tive; or that tend to reduce the opportunities those courts might enjoy for
adventurism").
316. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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forcement discretion.317 Throughout its opinion, however, the
Court hinted at further exceptions to the presumption, without
reconciling those hints with the "law to apply" analysis that it
purported to follow. 318
After Chaney, lower courts reviewing agency inaction have
had to struggle with the issues raised by the Court's manifest
ambivalence. Interestingly, these courts have developed analy-
ses that generally are consistent with the mode of pragmatic
reasoning described in the previous section. This body of case
law has been largely neglected in the academic literature, and
deserves scholarly inquiry in its own right. Accordingly, this
part reviews and critically evaluates several lines of cases. A
larger objective of the discussion, however, is to assess the prag-
matic approach to section 701(a)(2) by how well it has worked
- that is, to evaluate it "on pragmatic terms!"319
Some lower court rulings on the reviewability of agency in-
action are best understood as straightforward applications of
the Court's analysis in Chaney: in these cases, the presence 320
or absence 32' of statutory limits on agency enforcement discre-
tion has been decisive. In addition, an occasional decision has
extended Chaney to a type of agency inaction that the Court
did not squarely address.322
317. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
319. Farber, supra note 254, at 1349.
320. See, e.g., Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents & Associates, Inc. v.
Brown, 875 F.2d 453, 456 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding C'haney inapplicable be-
cause statutes and regulations specify circumstances under which Army Corps
of Engineers must issue permits for construction projects), cert denied, 110 S.
Ct. 720 (1990); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1075 (10th Cir. 1988) (al-
lowing judicial review based on specific duties that the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act assigns to the Bureau of Land Management).
321. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Larson, 882 F.2d 128, 132 (4th Cir. 1989) (refus-
ing judicial review because the Highway Beautification Act does not provide
standards concerning commencement of enforcement proceedings); Andrews
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that ju-
dicial review is inappropriate because § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act does not
limit the Department of Labor's discretion); Marlow v. Department of Educ.,
820 F.2d 581, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining that § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act does not allow judicial review because the statute does not provide guide-
lines), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988); Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n v.
Marsh, 815 F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding decision of Secretary of the
Army unreviewable because neither the Rivers and Harbors Act nor the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act provides guidelines for enforcement).
322. Courts have, of course, drawn upon Chaney's formalistic "law to ap-
ply" analysis in a wide range of contexts. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 228-
229. In the specific context of agency inaction, however, where one might have
expected Chaney's functional arguments against judicial review to carry influ-
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What is most striking, however, is how rapidly and consist-
ently the lower courts have limited the potential scope of Cha-
ney. As the discussion in this part will show, all the situations
the Chaney Court said might be distinguished were soon held
distinguishable by lower courts. Other exceptions emerged
without any encouragement from the Chaney opinion. One ex-
planation for this trend is that lower courts accurately per-
ceived the functional aspect of Chaney and applied it faithfully.
An alternative explanation is that the Court's opinion, with all
its intellectual weaknesses, simply was not compelling enough
to overcome the courts' propensity to apply doctrines of un-
reviewability narrowly.
Some of these limitations on the Chaney rule were entirely
predictable. Given that courts, under Chaney, could enforce
statutory restrictions on enforcement discretion, as in
Dunlop,323 it was only a short step to hold that they also could
enforce restrictions on enforcement discretion that were con-
tained in a binding regulation.324 Although judges often doubt
that a particular regulation was intended to confine agency dis-
cretion,325 they unanimously agree that a regulation that does
have this intent may be enforced. Likewise, Chaney has not
ence, there appear to be only two cases in which a court of appeals has extra-
polated the Chaney principle to a situation that was not squarely covered by
the Court's opinion. See Falkowski v. EEOC, 783 F.2d 252, 254 (D.C. Cir.) (ap-
plying the principle to a refusal to supply counsel to agency employee), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986); Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), discussed infra note 437. Neither decision appears to have been
influential.
323. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975).
324. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 802-03
(D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 846 F.2d 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1988); id. at
820 n.3 (Bork, J., dissenting); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v.
Baldrige, 827 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1987) (collecting authorities).
325. Compare Chong v. United States Information Agency, 821 F.2d 171,
175-76 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that rules permit review of USIA's failure to
waive residency requirements) with Singh v. Moyer, 867 F.2d 1035, 1038-39
(7th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases disagreeing with Chong's interpretation of
rule); see also Arnow v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 868 F.2d 223, 234-36 (7th
Cir.) (finding NRC rules nonbinding), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 61 (1989); Center
for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Dole, 846 F.2d 1532, 1534-35 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating
that rules constraining enforcement discretion are generally enforceable, but
Transportation Department rule in this case does not purport to limit agency's
discretion). It should be clear that a nonbinding rule is not "law" and thus
cannot furnish "law to apply." See Massachusetts Public Interest Research
Group v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1988); Padula
v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Cardoza v. CFTC, 768
F.2d 1542, 1550 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that an agency must follow rules upon
which the public justifiably relies).
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foreclosed review of allegations that an agency's enforcement
practices are unconstitutional. 3
26
Moreover, lower courts have been quick to act on Chzaney's
suggestion that the presumption of unreviewability could be
overcome if an agency had "'consciously and expressly adopted
a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdica-
tion of its statutory responsibilities."3 2 7 One can easily argue
that this kind of agency inaction violates the will of Congress,
and prior cases often had allowed judicial review in such cir-
cumstances.32 8 Finally, courts have not hesitated to review
cases in which there was an express statutory right to judicial
review of a nonenforcement decision.329 Although ('ianey's
language does not specifically envision this situation, Justice
Rehnquist's emphasis there on the primacy of Congress 330 dis-
pels any serious doubt that the Supreme Court would endorse
this development.
Other limitations were not as obviously appropriate under
the reasoning of Chaney. These limitations, therefore, must be
closely examined if one is to fully appreciate the lower courts'
willingness to seize opportunities to undercut Chaney.
A. LEGAL QUESTIONS AND OTHER "REVIEWABLE" ISSUES
A question that arose immediately after Chaney was
whether the presumption of reviewability would be overcome if
a litigant alleged that an agency's refusal to act was based on an
erroneous interpretation of substantive law. Challengers in
326. See Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484, 1489-93 (11th Cir. 1987) (permitting
judicial review of alleged racial discrimination in selection of persons to be in-
vestigated for election improprieties).
327. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (quoting Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)); see, e.g., Northern
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 782 F.2d 730, 745
(7th Cir. 1986) (finding FERC's abandonment of its function of ensuring just
rates is reviewable); Iowa ex reL Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347, 350-52 (8th Cir.
1985) (finding judicial review appropriate where the Department of Agricul-
ture does not pay farmers under an act contemplating such payments), cert
denied, 478 U.S. 1012 (1986).
328. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 59 n.* (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Office Employees Int'l
Union Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957); United States v. Markgraf, 736
F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (7th Cir. 1984); Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162.
329. See, ag., Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm. v. Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (allowing review pursuant to Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (1982)); Federal Election
Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).
330. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838.
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this type of case do not argue that Congress furnished "law to
apply" to the agency's enforcement policy; in fact, they may
concede that the agency could have declined to act simply be-
cause it was busy with other projects. Nonetheless, the chal-
lenger claims that the reasons the agency did give for not
acting betray a misunderstanding of its legal authority, and that
there is at least "law to apply" to the agency's chosen rationale.
This line of analysis builds upon the recognized scope-of-review
principle that a court may uphold discretionary agency action
only on the grounds relied on by the agency.3 3 ' Such a case
raises the question of the extent to which Czaney may be cut
back by resort to the concept of partial unreviewability.
Chaney itself was, at best, equivocal about the propriety of
such a loophole. Of course, in footnote four the Court observed
that the plaintiffs did not allege "a refusal by the agency to in-
stitute proceedings based solely on the belief that it lacks juris-
diction. 3 3 2 By its terms, however, this dictum was limited to
legal errors that could be characterized as "jurisdictional" in
nature. Elsewhere in the opinion, moreover, Justice Rehnquist
seemed to squarely reject the logical implications of this dic-
tum. The plaintiffs had argued that there was "law to apply" to
the FDA decision by pointing to the substantive provisions of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.33 3 Justice Rehnquist brus-
quely responded that the substantive provisions of the Act were
"simply irrelevant to the agency's discretion to initiate proceed-
ings. ' 334 This flat pronouncement appeared to cast considerable
doubt on the possibility that the Court would permit lower
courts to review alleged errors of law in the nonenforcement
context. The fact that the Court could easily have disposed of
the plaintiffs' argument on narrower grounds3 35 made its airy
dismissal of that argument all the more striking.
The lower courts, however, have not displayed any inclina-
tion to accept these negative signals. In UAW v. Brock,33 6 the
331. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943); Levin, supra note 27,
at 261. For a thorough discussion of how a focus on the challenger's conten-
tions opens up avenues for applying Chaney narrowly, see Sunstein, supra
note 52, at 675-83.
332. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
333. Id. at 835-36 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f)(1), 355 (1988)).
334. Id. at 836.
335. The Court could instead have pointed out that the Commissioner had
not relied "solely" on his construction of the substantive provisions, as speci-
fied in footnote four. Prosecutorial discretion had been an independent
ground for rejecting the plaintiff's request. Id. at 824.
336. 783 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Secretary of Labor declined to act on the union's complaint
that an employer, Kawasaki, had failed to file reports on the ac-
tivities of its supervisors and consultant, as allegedly mandated
by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.33 7
One reason for the agency's decision was that the Secretary re-
cently had concluded that these activities were exempt from
the reporting requirement.338 The D.C. Circuit held that the
Secretary's statutory interpretation was reviewable notwith-
standing Chaney.339 The panel stated that "courts are emphati-
cally qualified to decide [statutory questions] .... Indeed, it
seems almost ludicrous to suggest that there is 'no law to apply'
in reviewing whether an agency has reasonably interpreted a
law."3 40 The court's reasoning represented a considerable ex-
pansion of Chaney, which had established only that the pre-
sumption against review would be overcome if the agency's
enforcement policies were cabined by "law. 3 41 The court in
UAW ignored that limitation. Instead, it imported the Overton
Park version of the "law to apply" test into the inaction con-
text, so that any properly presented legal issue raised by the
plaintiff would support judicial review.
The UAW court did not address the propriety of the Secre-
tary's enforcement decision regarding Kawasaki in particular,
because that decision had rested on a mixture of discretionary
and legal rulings.m Subsequently, however, the D.C. Circuit
has assumed that an agency's decision not to act can be re-
manded if the decision rests on a misconstruction of law.343
One of the circuit's more curious decisions in this vein is
Safe Energy Coalition v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.-'" The plaintiffs asked the NRC to investigate a
nuclear power company's program for handling its employees'
safety-related complaints. They claimed that the program did
not comply with the Commission's "Appendix B" safety regula-
tions.345 The Commission refused to act,346 and the plaintiffs
337. Id at 241.
338. Id. at 242-43.
339. Id at 245-46.
340. Id.; see also Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 622
(D.C. Cir.) (stating that "the holding in Chaney in no way precludes judicial
review of agency decisions that are contrary to law"), vacated as moot, 817
F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
341. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
342. Id. at 242-43, 245 n.9; see infra notes 368-71 and accompanying text.
343. See Farmworker Justice Fund, 811 F.2d at 622.
344. 866 F.2d 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
345. Id. at 1474-75.
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filed for review.3 47 At first the court made the surprising asser-
tion that Chaney could not be distinguished on the ground that
the plaintiffs were seeking a "legal determination."3 4 8 This
statement, however, turned out to be only a bit of hairsplitting:
although the "legal" nature of the plaintiffs' allegations did not
keep the agency decision from being presumptively unreview-
able, the court carefully examined the merits of those allega-
tions to decide whether the Chaney presumption had been
rebutted.3 49 Accordingly, the court sustained the NRC's deci-
sion by finding that Appendix B did not apply to the nuclear
power company's program.3 50
As these cases reflect, the D.C. Circuit has consistently -
if obliquely - recognized a "legal issues" exception to the Cha-
ney rule. Other circuits apparently endorse this exception.35 1
Indeed, there appears to be no post-Chaney case in which a
court has held administrative inaction unreviewable in the face
of a clearly articulated claim that the agency had misconstrued
its statutory authority. This pattern is all the more striking in
light of the language in BLE suggesting, albeit in a different
context, that an otherwise unreviewable agency decision does
not become reviewable if the agency gave a legally flawed rea-
son for its decision.352 That signal (like the case itself, perhaps)
has simply been ignored. Nor have lower courts shown interest
in the question of whether particular legal issues were "juris-
dictional" and thus squarely covered by footnote four of Cha-
346. Id at 1475-76.
347. Id at 1474.
348. Id- at 1476-77.
349. Id at 1477-80.
350. Id at 1478.
351. See, e.g., Montana Air Chapter No. 29, Ass'n of Civilian Technicians v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth. 898 F.2d 753, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that FLRA General Counsel's refusal to issue an unfair labor practice com-
plaint is normally unreviewable, but may be reviewed if based on belief that
agency lacks jurisdiction); Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (3d Cir.
1989) (stating in dictum that agency decisions that allegedly violate a statutory
command are reviewable), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1113 (1990); Woodsmall v.
Lyng, 816 F.2d 1241, 1246 (8th Cir. 1987); Dina v. Attorney Gen. of United
States, 793 F.2d 473, 476-77 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that otherwise unreviewable
agency actions may be reviewed for fraud, absence of jurisdiction, or unconsti-
tutionality); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil & Gas Conservation,
792 F.2d 782, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases holding that "claims that
an agency has acted outside its statutory authority are reviewable even though
the agency's decision on the merits might be unreviewable as committed to
agency discretion"); Electricities of N.C., Inc. v. Southeastern Power Admin.,
774 F.2d 1262, 1267 (4th Cir. 1985).
352. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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ney;353 instead, they have been receptive to all kinds of claims
of legal error.354
In retrospect, it is easy to see why courts have embraced
this loophole so uniformly. The loophole has enabled them to
hold the challenger's claim reviewable by finding "law to ap-
ply" in exactly the same fashion as the Supreme Court did in
Overton Park;355 Chaney's innovative revision of the "law to ap-
ply" formula could simply be overlooked. Furthermore, in sim-
ilar pre-Chaney cases, the Supreme Court itself had often
reached the merits without expressing any concern about po-
tential reviewability difficulties.35 6 Moreover, when an agency
renders a legal interpretation in the form of a declaratory judg-
ment, an advisory letter, or an even more informal pronounce-
ment, judicial review has long been considered feasible.3S 7
Thus, as the District of Columbia Circuit noted in UAW, it
would make scant sense to hold that the agency could shield
the same legal interpretation from judicial scrutiny by simply
inserting it into a decision refusing to initiate an enforcement
proceeding.3 58
Most importantly, functional arguments strongly support
an exception to Chaney that allows judicial review of a nonen-
forcement decision that allegedly resulted from an agency's
legal error. In administrative law as a whole, judicial review of
legal issues tends to be more reliable and legitimate, and less
costly to accomplish, than review of factual or discretionary is-
353. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).
354. At various times in the history of administrative law, writers have
proposed that so-called "jurisdictional" issues should be subjected to especially
searching judicial review. None of these efforts has endured, and it is doubtful
that any convincing justification for such a distinction can be devised. See
Levin, supra note 32, at 371-78. Justice Brennan has recently defended the no-
tion that an agency's interpretation of limits on its jurisdiction should receive
less deference than other interpretations. See Mississippi Power & Light Co.
v. Mississippi er reL Moore, 108 S. Ct. 2428, 2446-47 (1988) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). The Court has never adopted this distinction, however, as Justice
Scalia convincingly demonstrated in the same case. See i& at 2443 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
355. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-13
(1971); supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
356. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 420 U.S. 395 (1975); cf NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S.
662 (1976) (remanding agency refusal to engage in rulemaking because agency
had misunderstood its statutory mandate).
357. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 438 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
358. UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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sues.359 At the same time, Chaney's practical arguments
against judicial review of nonenforcement decisions have rela-
tively little force when legal issues are involved. If the agency
says that it is declining to act because it lacks the legal author-
ity to proceed, the agency's interest in flexibility in the alloca-
tion of its personnel and other resources is not implicated.
Indeed, it would be odd for a court to defer to "prosecutorial
discretion" if the agency thinks it has no discretion to exercise.
Actually, the theory of the UAW case can be extrapolated
beyond purely legal issues, as the D.C. Circuit demonstrated in
Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock.3 60 In this case, the
Secretary of Labor ordered a two-year suspension in a long-
standing rulemaking proceeding involving a proposed require-
ment of field sanitary facilities for agricultural workers.36 1 The
Secretary indicated that the delay would give states time to ad-
dress the problem.362 Writing for a panel majority, Chief Judge
Wald assumed arguendo that under Chaney such a decision is
presumptively unreviewable. 363 She asserted, however, that the
presumption is overcome if the agency writes an opinion rest-
ing on reviewable reasons of any kind.36 Thus, only if the
agency relied on a reason that judges could not evaluate - such
as one involving allocation of scarce agency resources - would
the court refrain from review. Accordingly, the Farmworker
panel set aside the Secretary's decision: partly because of legal
errors, but also because the Secretary's hope that state authori-
ties would fill the gap appeared farfetched in light of the record
- an abuse of discretion rationale.3 65
Ultimately, the Farmworker case became moot and was va-
cated while awaiting en banc review,3 66 and therefore the panel
decision does not carry precedential weight. It would not be
surprising, however, to see another test of the "reviewable rea-
sons" limitation on Chaney in the near future. Indeed, the D.C.
359. See supra notes 291-99 and accompanying text.
360. 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
361. Id at 618.
362. Id. at 618-19.
363. Id. at 623 n.10. The court could reasonably have avoided the Ohaney
analysis entirely if it had analogized the Secretary's decision to a "negative or-
der" case rather than to a "nonenforcement" case. See infra notes 439-45 and
accompanying text.
364. Id. at 621 (stating that "Heckler assumes continued judicial review of
agency inaction for abuse of discretion where the decision is based on factors
that the court is competent to evaluate").
365. Id. at 631-33.
366. 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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Circuit already adheres to that limitation in other contexts in
which section 701(a)(2) is pleaded. 36 7 Acceptance of this rea-
soning would, of course, require the court to justify its decision
to review without reference to the "law to apply" theory. The
policy arguments for abuse of discretion review in the inaction
context are not as strong as in the case of "legal" review. If,
however, courts deem the policies behind Chaney to be even
weaker, the reviewable reasons limitation may ultimately
prevail.
Future debates over the scope of the "legal issues" limita-
tion are also likely to focus on issues of causation and proof.
One wonders whether to take seriously the Court's intimation
in footnote four of Chaney that an alleged misinterpretation of
law supports judicial review only if the agency reached its deci-
sion "solely" on that basis. Of course, if a challenged agency
decision rested on alternative and independent grounds - on
an allegedly erroneous legal ruling as well as on resource-allo-
cation considerations - review is foreclosed, for that was the
situation in Chaney itself.368 Less obvious is the proper disposi-
tion of a case in which managerial considerations contributed to
the agency's refusal to proceed, but might not have been suffi-
cient in the absence of the alleged legal error. The court in
UAW seemed to assume that judicial review should be fore-
closed in this situation as well,369 but that position is debatable.
Under normal scope-of-review principles, when a court finds
that an agency decision rested on a flawed rationale, the deci-
sion cannot stand unless the court is convinced the agency
would have reached the same result anyway.370 Similarly,
agencies should not be permitted to shield their nonenforce-
ment decisions from review by casually appending to them a
boilerplate reference to prosecutorial discretion.37 1
367. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1518 & n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (dictum),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988);
Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 44-46 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court's
reversal of Doe does not necessarily repudiate this argument. The Court as-
sumed that only legal claims were presented, ignoring the entire issue of abuse
of discretion review. Doe, 486 U.S. at 599-601.
368. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 824.
369. See UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 245 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that
agency's decision not to act had been predicated on both discretionary and stat-
utory grounds).
370. See Levin, supra note 27, at 261-62.
371. See Conservative Era, supra note 123, at 386-87 (remarks of Alan Mor-
rison); cf. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 n.74
(1981) (stating that "[s]ince the Secretary had already presented an unauthor-
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A related, and as yet unsettled, issue arises if an agency's
decision not to commence enforcement proceedings is unex-
plained or poorly explained. One can read Chaney to mean
that if an asserted legal error is not obvious from the face of
the agency's opinion, the "presumption of unreviewability" re-
mains unrebutted and the administrative decision must stand.
On the other hand, normal scope-of-review principles authorize
a court to remand a case if an agency has failed to explain its
decision fully enough to permit judicial review. 72 If one
strongly believes that a nonenforcement decision should be re-
versed if it rests on certain improper premises, such as mis-
taken assumptions about the agency's jurisdiction, it would be
logical to allow courts some authority to investigate whether
those premises underlie an ambiguous agency decision. At a
minimum, courts presumably may enforce the APA's require-
ment that an agency's denial of a request to commence a pro-
ceeding be accompanied by a "brief statement of the grounds
for denial."3 7 3
B. REFUSALS TO INITIATE RULEMAKiNG
Although Chaney explicitly left open "the question of
agency discretion to invoke rulemaking proceedings, ' 374 there
ized reason for the guarantee provision, we decline to accept this 'boilerplate'
statement as a sufficient determination").
372. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 395-97
(1974); Levin, supra note 27, at 261-62.
373. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1988); see Chaney, 470 U.S. at 841 & n.1 (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 594 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roelofs v. Secretary of Air Force, 628 F.2d 594, 599-
600 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In the context of an agency's refusal to reopen a case (a situation to which
§ 555(e) by its terms does not apply), Justice Stevens has suggested that a
court should simply presume that an unexplained decision rested on permissi-
ble discretionary considerations. ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
(BLE), 482 U.S. 270, 291 n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). That presumption
may be plausible, although in other contexts doubts about the basis of a deci-
sion below are sometimes resolved in favor of a court's ability to entertain an
appeal. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 104041 (1983) (holding that in an
appeal from an ambiguous state court judgment that may have rested on state
grounds or federal constitutional grounds or both, Supreme Court will pre-
sume that federal ground was a significant enough element to support Court's
review jurisdiction).
374. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 825 n.2. The Court erred in asserting that the case
did not present such a question. Plaintiffs had asked for more than individual
relief. They had also asked the FDA to "[p]lace in the Drug Bulletin an article
advising that the [execution] drugs ... are not approved" and to "[a]dopt a pol-
icy and procedure for the seizure and condemnation" of execution drugs. Cha-
ney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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were reasonable grounds for thinking that the courts might ex-
tend Chaney by declining to review agency refusals to engage in
rulemaking ("nonpromulgation decisions"). Broadly speaking,
the problem for a reviewing court in this situation is the same
as the one Justice Rehnquist identified for nonenforcement de-
cisions:375 the agency's inaction may simply reflect the fact that
the agency prefers to devote its limited resources to other ar-
eas. Furthermore, to the extent that Chaney rests on the no-
tion that judicial review is less necessary when an agency has
not coerced anyone, that point applies equally to nonpromulga-
tion decisions. Significantly, Justice Marshall, in his separate
opinion in Chaney, questioned whether the majority would be
able to find any substantial differences between the two
situations.3 76
Nevertheless, in American Horse Protection Association v.
Lyng (AHPA), 377 the D.C. Circuit adhered to its previous
view378 by holding that agencies' refusals to commence
rulemaking are fully reviewable despite Chaney.379 Judge Wil-
liams, writing for the court, conceded the strength of the above
arguments for extending Chaney, but offered other reasons for
Although these actions would not have created binding obligations, they would
technically have been "rules" within the meaning of the APA. See Depart-
ment of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1149-51 (5th Cir. 1984);
Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 710 F.2d
842, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
375. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
376. Id at 850 n.7 (Marshall, J., concurring).
377. 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
378. See VWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court
in AHPA did not rely directly on pre-Chaney precedents in finding non-
promulgation decisions to be reviewable, perhaps because it realized that those
precedents could contribute little to the analysis. The court in WWTHT had
justified its position by relying on the Abbott Laboratories presumption of re-
viewability and on a fragment of legislative history. See id at 814-16. After
Chaney, however, any reliance on a presumption would clearly have begged
the question of which presumption to use; and the legislative history cited by
the court had always been rather suspect, for reasons well discussed in Sun-
stein, supra note 52, at 681.
Although Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1979), is often cited as having supported the reviewability of refusals
to initiate rulemaking proceedings, it actually dealt with a different subject:
whether a court may review an agency's failure to issue a rule after conducting
a rulemalng proceeding. Id at 1047. That is a much easier question, see infra
Part IV. C. 1., and the court in NRDC itself was at pains to distinguish the two
situations. See id at 1045-47.
379. AHPA, 812 F.2d at 4. The Seventh Circuit has hinted at a contrary
view, but only in a brief dictum. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d
645, 655 (7th Cir. 1986).
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distinguishing nonenforcement decisions from nonpromulga-
tion decisions.38 0 In the first place, he said, the Chaney holding
rested heavily on an analogy to the tradition of prosecutorial
discretion.38 ' This analogy, in turn, reflected the fact that non-
enforcement decisions, like exercises of prosecutorial discre-
tion, are "numerous" and "are typically based mainly on close
consideration of the facts of the case at hand, rather than on
legal analysis."382 Nonpromulgation decisions, in contrast, "are
likely to be relatively infrequent and more likely to turn upon
issues of law."38 3
In addition, said the court, when an agency refuses to initi-
ate rulemaking, the APA provides a "focal point" for judicial
review, because it requires agencies to entertain petitions for
the issuance of a rule (section 553(e)) and also requires them to
explain the denial of such petitions in a written statement (sec-
tion 555(e)).3 8 4 The Chaney opinion, of course, had alluded to
the absence of a "focus for judicial review" as a reason for not
reviewing nonenforcement decisions.38 5 Judge Williams con-
cluded by pledging that, in any event, the court would overturn
nonpromulgation decisions "'only in the rarest and most com-
pelling of circumstances.' "1386
Every one of the AHPA court's arguments was unpersua-
sive. First, Judge Williams presented no support for the propo-
sition that nonpromulgation cases would be less prevalent than
nonenforcement cases. It certainly is true that agencies receive
- and consequently decline - requests for enforcement ac-
tions more often than rulemaking petitions.38 7 The underlying
policy goal, however, is to alleviate the practical burdens that
judicial review can impose on both courts and agencies; there-
fore the relevant question appears to be whether petitions for
judicial review are more likely to be filed in one situation than
in the other. It is not at all clear that the number of persons
who will seek review of nonpromulgation decisions under
380. AHPA, 812 F.2d at 4.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id
384. Id. (discussing 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(e), 555(e)).
385. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); see supra note 124 and ac-
companying text.
386. AHPA, 812 F.2d at 5 (quoting WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
387. See Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An
Overview of Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommenda-
tions for Improvement, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 1, 43.
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AHPA is less than the number of persons who, in the absence
of Chaney, would seek review of nonenforcement decisions.388
Similarly, Judge Williams did not justify his assertion that
refusals to commence rulemaking are more likely to raise legal
issues than refusals to commence enforcement proceedings.
The difference between rulemaking and adjudication depends
primarily on the number of people who will be affected by the
proposed action.38 9 On the other hand, the most important fac-
tor affecting the likelihood of a "legal" challenge is whether
the agency is acting at the outskirts of its statutory authority,
thus inviting a "legal" challenge, or squarely within its author-
ity, in which case any court challenges are more likely to in-
volve factual or policy issues. There is no obvious relationship
between these two variables.39° Indeed, even if legal issues will
arise more often in nonpromulgation cases, the significance of
this fact is questionable. For there already is an established ex-
ception to Chaney where legal issues are raised; thus, the prin-
ciple adopted in AHPA is important only where an agency
refusal to initiate rulemaking does not raise a discrete legal
issue.391
The court's APA arguments also were strained. Although
section 555(e) does require an agency to furnish a written ex-
planation when it denies a rulemaking petition, Judge Williams
failed to mention that it imposes exactly the same requirement
388. In an unscientific but perhaps instructive investigation of this ques-
tion, I examined the list of twenty-five lower court cases that Justice Marshall
cited in Chaney as having been thrown into question by the majority opinion.
See Chanej, 470 U.S. at 850 n.7 (Marshall, J., concurring). Refusals to issue
rules were involved in eight of the twenty-five - a ratio that gives modest
support to the court's generalization. A number of the cited cases, however,
predated the general expansion of administrative rulemaking during the mid-
1970s. Of the cases cited by Justice Marshall that had been decided after 1976,
seven out of eight had involved requests for rulemaking! (The early non-
promulgation case was Rckbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971); the
recent nonenforcement case was Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers
Union, Local Union No. 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1981).)
389. See 2 K. DAvis, surpra note 32, §§ 7:2-:3.
390. It is interesting to observe that, contrary to what the court's hypothe-
sis would predict, the merits issues in Chzney were almost entirely legal, see
Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1179-82 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the
FDA had jurisdiction over lethal drugs), rev'd, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), while the
merits issues in AHPA were largely factual, see 812 F.2d at 6 (holding that the
Department of Agriculture failed to articulate the factual and policy bases for
its decision, relied on questionable data, and misapprehended its statutory
mission).
391. See supra Part IV. A.
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when an agency denies a petition for enforcement action.392
The only difference in the APA's treatment of the two types of
petitions is that section 553(e) requires agencies to accept peti-
tions for rulemaking. This difference, however, should not
carry much weight: few agencies, if any, will not allow citizens
to petition for individual enforcement action. Consequently, it
is difficult to see a basis for the court's assertion that a non-
promulgation decision offers more of a "focal point" for judicial
review than a nonenforcement decision.3 93
The court's final suggestion, that review of nonpromulga-
tion decisions can be kept manageable because the scope of re-
view will be narrow, is more difficult to appraise. In the
abstract, this appears to be an attractive compromise between
the conflicting pulls of Chaney and Abbott Laboratories. When
the AHPA court turned to the merits, however, it reversed the
agency on the basis of a standard "hard look" analysis that was
indistinguishable from many of the court's opinions that are
governed by "normal" standards of review.394 Of course, it
never is easy for the reader of a judicial opinion to know how
deferentially its author (let alone other panel members) ap-
proached the case. Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has yet to decide a nonpromulgation case in which the
substance of its analysis would clearly have been different if
the court had not been paying an "extra" measure of defer-
ence.3 95 One need not question the court's good faith to suspect
392. "Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a
written application, petition, or other request of an interested person made in
connection with any agency proceeding." 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1988) (emphasis
added). See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 594 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Intercity Transp. Co. v. United States,
737 F.2d 103, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (concluding that agency's refusal to institute
declaratory order proceeding was not committed to agency's discretion, in part
because § 555(e) would provide a basis for review).
393. In any event, when Justice Rehnquist hinted in Chaney that nonen-
forcement decisions are difficult to review because of their lack of "focus,"
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985), he probably was not referring to
the Court's need for a written explanation. The FDA in Chaney, after all, had
provided just such an explanation. Id at 824-25. (For an alternate interpreta-
tion of the "focus" language in Chaney, see supra note 125 and accompanying
text.)
394. See AHPA, 812 F.2d at 5-7.
395. In addition to AHPA, see, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. NHTSA, 898
F.2d 165, 170-77 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 883 F.2d 1073, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir. 1989); National Customs Bro-
kers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am., Inc., v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96-103
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Luneburg, supra note 387, at 48 n.280 (citing other cases). But
cf National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. Department of Energy, 851
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that this exceptional leniency is too elusive to matter very
much in the overall debate over the reviewability of non-
promulgation decisions.39 6
Of course, the AHPA exception does have a certain appeal.
When one considers the matter in isolation from Chaney, there
is a strong argument that review of nonpromulgation decisions
is not unduly difficult.397 Furthermore, the court did not men-
tion the most obvious argument for distinguishing Chaney: that
the need for judicial oversight of the policymaking process is
more pressing than the need for judicial oversight of agencies'
dispositions of individual complaints. By its nature, rulemaking
usually affects many more people than adjudication. When an
agency refuses to commence a rulemaking proceeding, there-
fore, the stakes are relatively high; society may simply be un-
willing to trust such important matters to the unreviewed
discretion of the bureaucracy.3 98 Judges sometimes endorse un-
reviewability because of their reluctance to supervise "mun-
dane" or "minor" agency decisions,399 and that rationale has
F.2d 1424, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (NARUC). In NARUC, the petitioners chal-
lenged an Energy Department cost allocation methodology, arguing that the
agency should have developed the methodology by holding an APA rulemak-
ing proceeding. Id. at 1430. The department's defense was that the methodol-
ogy was merely an interpretive rule, exempt from APA requirements. Id. at
1430-31. The court declined to decide whether the agency's view was correct,
stating that under ARPA it could sustain the agency by merely finding that
the agency's view was a "reasoned" one. Id. at 1431. The NARUC example
proves very little, however, because the court's reliance on AHPA was a seri-
ous blunder. NARUC was not a case of administrative inaction; it was a case in
which the agency had acted, and the only issue was whether the agency should
have used rulemaking procedure. Chaney and its progeny have nothing to do
with that issue.
In any event, the question raised in the accompanying text is whether a
court can fulfill AHPA's pledge to apply a standard of review that is more leni-
ent than other applications of the "arbitrary and capricious" test. Since APA
compliance usually is reviewed de novo, the fact that the NARUC court found
itself able to apply an unusually deferential standard in the APA context
sheds little light on that question.
396. See Luneburg, supra note 387, at 48-49.
397. Id. at 43-44.
398. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 486 & n.305. For examples of major
regulatory decisions that have come before the courts on appeal from denials
of rulemaking petitions, see Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC,
809 F.2d 860, 863 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (ordering review of FCC's refusal to
commence proceedings to abandon the fairness doctrine), vacated, 831 F.2d
1148 (1987); Quincy Cable TV, Inc., v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1447 n.29 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (discussing "must-carry" rules for cable systems), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986).
399. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (asserting that "[ilt is entirely permissible to presume that Congress has
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much less force in a nonpromulgation case than in a nonen-
forcement case.
Without some refinements, however, the AHPA principle
may prove difficult to administer in an evenhanded way. One
can foresee puzzling linedrawing problems. Suppose a citizen
urges an agency to address a given problem, without specifying
what action it should take: should this request be interpreted
as seeking a rule or an individual enforcement proceeding?
What if the citizen suggests that the agency employ both kinds
of remedies as was the case in Chaney itself?40 Perhaps the
best solution lies somewhere between the two poles of Chaney
and AHPA: courts ultimately may decide that nonpromulgation
decisions should be reviewable under some circumstances in
which nonenforcement decisions would not be, but not under
all circumstances. 40 1
What is most striking about the AHPA principle is that it
not intended courts to review such mundane matters" as "[i]ndividual, isolated
nonenforcement decisions"); compare United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201,
210 (1982) (holding that Congress precluded review of the amount of individ-
ual Medicare Part B determinations "'in order to avoid overloading the courts
with quite minor matters' ") (quoting legislative history) with Bowen v. Michi-
gan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 680 & n.11 (1986) (contrasting
"quite minor matters" with the "substantial" issues presented by challenges to
Medicare regulations, which remained reviewable). Some language in Chaney
can be read to imply that the magnitude of the need for judicial review is irrel-
evant, but close scrutiny of the opinion refutes that interpretation. See supra
note 136.
400. See supra note 374.
401. One possible solution would be to make the reviewability of a non-
promulgation decision depend on the extent to which the agency has compiled
a full record and explained its reasons for denying the petition for rulemaking;
a court would make an ad hoc judgment about whether it felt it could deal
meaningfully with the regulatory issues. See Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1047 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoted supra
note 176). An attractive feature of this solution is that the petitions the agency
takes most seriously at the administrative level would stand the greatest
chance of being reviewed. To that extent, this solution is grounded in a
healthy respect for the agency's interest in controlling its agenda.
One flaw in this case-by-case approach, however, is that its test for review-
ability would be almost completely subjective. Because parties would be un-
able to predict in advance whether a court would deem the agency's decision
reviewable, they would have to file briefs on the merits in nearly every case.
Similarly, this solution would do little to save time for judges, because courts
would have to probe deeply into the merits in order to decide whether the rec-
ord was in sufficiently good shape to permit review of the particular conten-
tions advanced by the plaintiff. On balance, therefore, this alternative
approach may compare unfavorably to the D.C. Circuit's present approach: it
might be only slightly less burdensome than the AHPA rule, and it certainly
would be more complicated.
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has become established in the D.C. Circuit without any visible
controversy. Despite serious weaknesses in the opinion, the
court of appeals - which is intimately familiar with Chaney
and certainly has its champions of agency autonomy 40 2 - has
been content to allow Judge Williams' position to stand.40 3 No-
tice, in particular, that the "law to apply" test was never men-
tioned in AHPA; Judge Williams explained and distinguished
Chaney on functional grounds alone.404 That this line of rea-
soning occasioned no public challenge says a great deal about
the D.C. Circuit's understanding of - and regard for - the
Supreme Court's opinion.
C. ALREADY-COMMENCED PROCEEDINGS
Chaney dealt with an agency's refusal to commence pro-
ceedings, but the subject of "administrative inaction" can crop
up in a variety of other settings as well. This section explores
some of the other facets of that phenomenon and how Chaney
bears on the courts' responses to them.
1. Negative orders
The easiest case involves the so-called "negative order," in
which an agency conducts an entire proceeding, examines a reg-
ulatory problem on the merits, and then decides for substantive
reasons to do nothing. The Supreme Court has recognized the
reviewability of the negative order for fifty years.405 The
Court's decision in Chaney almost certainly leaves the law un-
changed in this respect. 4° 6 After all, judicial review of the neg-
402. See The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40
ADmiIN. L. REv. 507, 523-27 (1988) (panel discussion) (remarks of Chief Judge
Wald) (noting the "court's contributions ... in the area of insulating agency
inaction from judicial challenge").
403. E.g., National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am. Inc. v.
United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Shipbuilders Council of Am.,
Inc. v. United States, 868 F.2d 452, 456 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (dictum).
404. See supra notes 377-86 and accompanying text.
405. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1939); 4
K. DAVIS, ADmINISTRATIVE LAWV TREATISE § 28.17 (1st ed. 1958); see also City
of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162, 165-67 (1969) (holding that ICC deci-
sion to take no action to prevent rail service termination was reviewable,
although initial refusal to investigate would not have been). Without discuss-
ing reviewability, the Court has often reviewed negative orders on the merits.
See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (reviewing FDA's re-
fusal to exempt from regulation drugs for the terminally ill); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 447 (1978) (reviewing Treasury depart-
ment's finding that no action was required on a countervailing duty claim).
406. See Kemmons Wilson, Inc. v. FAA, 882 F.2d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir.
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ative order threatens none of the policies underlying Chaney.40 7
It does not implicate the courts' limited ability to supervise
agencies' choices about the allocation of their resources; by the
time the petition for review is filed, the resources will already
have been expended. Instead, the petitioner will simply argue
the merits, and there certainly will be "law to apply" to that
question (assuming that there would have been law to apply if
the agency had acted affirmatively). In addition, the agency's
previous decision to conduct the proceeding will reflect its view
that the problem is substantial, thus alleviating concerns about
interference with prosecutorial discretion.40 8  Finally, the
agency presumably will have compiled a record and written an
opinion explaining its decision, thus providing a "focus" for the
court's review.40 9
2. Delay
A less clear-cut problem, one might have thought, is
whether Chaney casts doubt on the power of a court to require
an agency to complete an excessively protracted proceeding.
Prior to Chaney, the courts' power to rectify administrative de-
lay under some circumstances was well established.410 The pre-
vailing approach was elaborately stated by the D.C. Circuit in
1984 in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC
(TRAC).4 1 ' Writing for the court, Judge Edwards announced a
"rule of reason," consisting of six equitable factors that the
1989); Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 872
F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v.
Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dictum); see also Consumers
Union of United States v. FTC, 801 F.2d 417, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.)
(stating that when FTC adopted rule but failed to include provision sought by
petitioners, its decision was not equivalent to a failure to commence rulemak-
ing; holding that court should review rationality of agency's choice in light of
suggested alternatives).
407. C. Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229, 1239-40 (D.D.C. 1987)
(explaining why a decision not to adopt a rule, following a rulemaking pro-
ceeding, should be evaluated under the normal arbitrary-capricious standard of
review).
408. See City of Chicago, 396 U.S. at 166.
409. See Williams Natural Gas, 872 F.2d at 443; Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
410. See NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Ironworkers, Local 480, 466 U.S. 720, 725 n.7 (1984) (per curiam); Costle v. Pa-
cific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 220 n.14 (1980). See generally Eisner, Agency
Delay in Informal Rulemaking, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 7, 12-31 (1989) (undertaking a
comprehensive treatment of the law on judicial review of agency delay); Levin,
supra note 27, at 289-90 (providing a concise summary of same topic).
411. 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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courts should weigh in deciding whether a given agency's delay
was unreasonable.4"
Once Chaney had held that much agency inaction was "pre-
sumptively" beyond judicial correction, however, one might
have supposed that the law on unreasonable delay would also
be affected. After all, delay cases implicate some of the core
concerns of Chaney: the judiciary's limited capacity to decide
whether the agency should be devoting its resources to the mat-
ters sought by the plaintiff, as opposed to other matters; the ab-
sence of "law" to guide the court's deliberations; 413 and the
absence of a "focus" for review, such as an actual agency deci-
sion would provide.4' 4
The lower courts, however, have refrained from extending
Chaney to cases involving allegedly unreasonable delay. In-
stead, they have continued to decide these cases in much the
same fashion as they did before Chaney. Sometimes courts
have ordered immediate agency action,415 sometimes they have
expressed concern but limited themselves to warnings, 416 and
sometimes they have found the agency's pace reasonable.417
412. According to TRAC, the court should (1) apply a rule of reason, (2)
look to statutory guidance if available, (3) be especially vigilant when human
health and welfare are at stake, (4) consider competing priorities of the
agency, (5) consider the interests prejudiced by delay, and (6) not require a
showing of agency impropriety. Id. at 80.
413. Even when Congress has directed an agency to take action by a spe-
cific date, reviewing courts have not always treated a missed deadline as con-
clusive on the question of whether there has been unreasonable delay. See
Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines, 39 ADMIN.
L. REV. 171, 178-79 (1987). As to whether the APA itself furnishes "law to ap-
ply," see infra note 423 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 114-15, 122-25 (discussing these core concerns in
Chaney).
415. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263, 1270 (3d
Cir. 1987) (directing OSHA to issue, within 60 days, rule governing labeling of
hazardous materials by nonmanufacturing industries); Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Commissioner, FDA, 724 F. Supp. 1013, 1022 (D.D.C 1989)
(ordering FDA to issue tampon absorbency labeling rule within 2 months).
416. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626,
629 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that OSHA's proposed timetable to
include a short-term exposure limit in its ethylene oxide rules "treads at the
very lip of the abyss of unreasonable delay").
417. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797-99 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that EPA's deliberations on fugitive emissions regulations in strip
mining were not unusually delayed after three years); Federal Election
Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1091 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding justified
the FEC's two-year disposition of Congressman's complaint); Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding
MSHA's two year timetable to make rules to protect miners from radon
exposure).
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They have not, however, been fazed by the vagueness of the
TRAC formula, or by the inevitable shortcomings of the agency
record on appeal, or by the hazards of second-guessing the
agency's resource-allocation and other managerial judgments.
Instead of supporting a "presumption against judicial review,"
these considerations have served as mere prudential factors
counseling judicial restraint in the resolution of unreasonable
delay claims on their merits.
Indeed, the lower courts have scarcely deemed the poten-
tial relevance of Chaney to delay cases worthy of discussion.
The District of Columbia Circuit briefly mentioned the issue in
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Zegeer.418 The court, how-
ever, did not come to grips with Chaney's analysis. Rather, it
simply noted that the two situations were not the same and
went on to assume that TRAC was still good law.4 19
What explains the absence of efforts to apply Chaney in de-
lay cases?4 0 Of course, section 706(1) of the APA specifically
contemplates court orders that "compel agency action ... un-
reasonably delayed."'' 1 The same clause, however, also envi-
sions judicial relief from "agency action unlawfully
withheld,"'422 and yet Chaney establishes that this provision is
qualified by the "committed to agency discretion" language of
section 701(a)(2). Why then have lower courts ignored the pos-
sibility that section 701(a)(2) also limits the delay provision of
section 706(1)?2 3 Probably part of the reason is that they are
essentially unconvinced by the fundamental premises of Cha-
ney. Not being under pressure from the Supreme Court to ex-
418. 768 F.2d 1480, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
419. See id
420. The issue is open in the Supreme Court. In Brock v. Pierce County,
476 U.S. 253 (1986), the Court indicated that a court could invoke § 706(1) to
expedite the Secretary of Labor's consideration of a complaint that a CETA
grant recipient had misspent funds. See id at 260 n.7. In doing so, however,
the Court noted that the matter clearly was not "committed to agency discre-
tion," because the statute said that the Secretary "shall" act within 120 days.
Id.
421. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1988).
422. Id.
423. One can argue that the APA differentiates inaction from delay, in that
it devotes an additional provision to the latter. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (stating that
"within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter
presented to it"); see Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC,
750 F.2d 70, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This provision, however, would not seem to
contribute any more "law to apply" than § 706(1) does. Perhaps a better argu-
ment is that the precise wording of § 706(1) -- "unlawfully withheld or unrea-
sonably delayed" - implies that courts should rely on "law" in inaction cases
(as Chaney indicates) and "reason" in delay cases.
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tend that opinion, lower courts have not gone out of their way
to find an opportunity to do so.
3. Midstream Dismissals
Some exceptionally subtle problems are posed by "mid-
stream dismissal" cases - those in which an agency drops a
case while administrative proceedings are under way but before
they have ended. Perhaps such a case should be compared with
Chaney - an exercise of enforcement discretion that the courts
may not review. The agency's decision may, after all, rest on
the same t3pe of managerial considerations that Chaney said
courts cannot evaluate.42 Alternatively, the decision could be
analogized to a negative order case.425 The decision may rest on
conclusions that the agency reached about the merits while the
case was alive. At this time, no consistent judicial response to
the midstream dismissal problem has yet emerged.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions are pertinent. In
Cuyahoga Valley Railway v. United Transportation Union,42 6
the Court held that the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission could not review the Secretary of Labor's with-
drawal of a citation accusing an employer of safety violations.4 7
Then, in NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local 23,428 the Court held that the General Counsel of the
NLRB has unreviewable discretion to withdraw an unfair labor
complaint before a hearing occurs.429 The Court observed that
an official who has unreviewable discretion to determine
whether to issue a citation should logically have final authority
over whether to withdraw it, 430 and that a contrary rule would
constrain the government's ability to negotiate settlements.43 '
Both Cuyahoga and United Food Workers, however, differ
from many other midstream dismissal cases in a vital respect.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act 432 and the National
Labor Relations Act 433 utilize the "split-enforcement" model of
424. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
425. See supra Part IV. C. 1.
426. 474 U.S. 3 (1985) (per curiam).
427. Id at 7.
428. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
429. Id at 126; see also International Bhd. of Boilermakers Local 6 v.
NLRB, 872 F.2d 331, 334 (9th Cir. 1989) (extending United Food Workers un-
reviewability beyond the commencement of a hearing).
430. United Food Workers, 484 U.S. at 126.
431. Id. at 127-28; Cuyahoga, 474 U.S. at 7.
432. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
433. Id. §§ 151-169 (1982).
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administrative enforcement: prosecution decisions are vested in
one entity, adjudication in another.434 Thus it was natural for
the Court to view the Secretary of Labor and the NLRB's Gen-
eral Counsel as prosecutors, for that is the only role they play
in the adjudicatory process. In the usual regulatory scheme,
however, the decision whether to commence a proceeding and
the ultimate decision on the merits are both made by the
agency head. When such an agency decides to terminate a case,
Cuyahoga and United Food Workers are weak authority for the
proposition that courts should view the action as a prosecutorial
decision rather than a merits decision.
Furthermore, any fixed rule that a midstream dismissal is
as unreviewable as a refusal to commence proceedings would
lead to paradoxical results. As noted, courts continue to assert
the power to force an agency to complete a proceeding that
they deem unreasonably delayed.435 It would be anomalous to
maintain that the courts can feasibly review a proceeding while
it is pending, but not after it has been dropped. Indeed, judicial
review of the midstream dismissal case seems more manageable
than review of the delay case: at least the agency has acted,
and thus the court can examine a tangible disposition of the
matter.
To the extent that any pattern in the cases on reviewability
of midstream dismissals can be discerned, much appears to de-
pend on the court's perception of the rationale behind a mid-
stream dismissal. If the case has developed to the point that
there is a substantial record, and the agency prepares an opin-
ion explaining the dismissal, a court is likely to assume that the
action is a substantive decision that should be reviewed on the
merits.436 On the other hand, if the dismissal occurred soon af-
434. See Occupational Safety and Health Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1982)
(providing that Secretary of Labor brings enforcement actions, but Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission adjudicates them); National La-
bor Relations Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982) (providing that General
Counsel has final authority over issuance of complaints that will be adjudi-
cated by the Board). See generally Johnson, The Split-Enforcement ModeL
Some Conclusions From the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADmIN. L. REV.
315 (1987) (discussing the OSHA split-enforcement setup).
435. See cases discussed supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text.
436. See Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 373 U.S. 294, 308 (1963) (re-
viewing termination of rate proceedings for abuse of discretion); Arctic Slope
Regional Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 832 F.2d 158, 166-68
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (same), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 175 (1988); Association of Busi-
nesses Advocating Tariff Equity v. Hanzlik, 779 F.2d 697, 701-02 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (same); see also Brandenfels v. Day, 316 F.2d 375, 379-80 (D.C. Cir.) (sup-
porting reviewability), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 824 (1963). If a case is dismissed
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ter the proceeding was commenced, the agency action likely
will be regarded as an unreviewable exercise of Chaney-like
prosecutorial discretion.437
This timing distinction, however, has never been articu-
lated in the cases. Moreover, even if it were adopted, it is
hardly a principle that courts could apply with much precision.
Many, if not most, midstream dismissals result from a combina-
tion of factors, some of which the agency may not choose to ac-
knowledge.438  Nevertheless, the case law probably will
continue to be shaped in part by judges' intuitions about
whether a given dismissal results from managerial considera-
tions or from substantive regulatory policy views. For the im-
mediate future, judicial flexibility in this area may be the least
unattractive approach available.
4. Classification Problems
Obviously, the categories discussed in this section - nega-
tive order, delay, midstream dismissal - are theoretical con-
structs. In practice, they will not always be easy to distinguish
from each other.43 9 After all, they all involve a lack of agency
activity. The absence of visible activity might be interpreted to
when it is virtually complete, the court may denounce the dismissal as an at-
tempt to evade the responsibility of decision on the ultimate issues, and may
order the agency to complete the case. See Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 294 F.2d 212, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Courts use this approach
sparingly, however. See Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 373 U.S. at 311
(distinguishing termination of proceeding due to a stale record from "a case in
which the Commission has walked right up to the line and then refused to
cross it"); Arctic Slope, 832 F.2d at 164-66 (holding Minneapolis Gas inapplica-
ble because case was "regrettably far from complete" when FERC terminated
it).
437. See Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 685-85 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(holding that FDA's decision to settle three-month-old seizure action against
manufacturer was unreviewable under Chaney); cf. North Carolina Utils.
Comm'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 653 F.2d 655, 668-69 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (finding Commission's action not reviewable where it conducted prelimi-
nary inquiry into pipeline's gas supply, but declined to take further enforce-
ment measures).
438. Consider the disagreement between the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir.), va-
cated as moot, 817 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1987), over whether or not the
Secretary's abandonment of rulemaking proceedings concerning sanitary facili-
ties for agricultural workers was significantly based on resource allocation
considerations. Compare i& at 623 n.11 (Wald, C.J.) (concluding that it was
not) with id, at 638-40 (Williams, J., dissenting) (concluding that it was).
439. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (not-
ing that a court may view agency inaction as effectively final action, as abdica-
tion of duty, or as unreasonable delay).
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mean either that the agency refuses to act (inaction) or that it
has not acted yet (delay)." 0 Obviously it is troubling to make
reviewability turn on judicial guesswork about the agency's in-
tentions, which are not susceptible of direct proof. Even if the
agency conducts a minimal investigation and then declares that
it will take no further action, one could characterize its decision
either as the product of a brief proceeding (reviewable as a fi-
nal agency action), or as a refusal to commence a proceeding
(unreviewable under Chaney).
Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock 441 illustrates these
difficulties. The Secretary of Labor, after fourteen years of
proceedings to establish sanitary facilities requirements for ag-
ricultural workers, announced that he would suspend action in
order to give states an opportunity to handle the problem them-
selves.442 The D.C. Circuit noted that the case had some fea-
tures of a delay case, and some features of a negative order." 3
Either of these characterizations would have suggested that the
action was reviewable.4 " Nevertheless, both the majority and
dissenting judges also recognized that the case was at least simi-
lar to the kind of "inaction" addressed in Chaney; thus, they
each considered at length, but ultimately rejected, the possible
application of Chaney to the case before them.445 Farmworker
exemplifies what may prove to be a typical and appropriate ju-
dicial reaction to hard-to-classify cases involving agency inac-
tion: a cautious, exploratory approach to the question of
reviewability, marked by a reluctance to extend Chaney beyond
its necessary limits.
440. Compare the long-recognized doctrine that protracted delay can be
viewed as a de facto denial of relief, thus satisfying the judicial review prereq-
uisite of a "final" agency action. See, e.g., id. at 793 (discussing Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970)); see also
Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 845 F.2d 1105, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (finding that NRC's issuance of allegedly inadequate policy statement
should be analyzed as a final action, not as a continuing "delay" in taking cor-
rect action; thus, suit was time-barred because of petitioners' failure to seek
review within 180 days of the agency action).
441. 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
442. 1d. at 618.
443. See id. at 623 n.10. The comparison with a negative order - or, to use
the court's phrase, a "conditional withdrawal of a proposed rule after comple-
tion of rulemaking," id. - was probably the most apt analogy.
444. See id.
445. See id. at 620-24 (Wald, C.J.); id. at 635-37 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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D. SUMMARY
The precise holding of Chaney still survives: an adminis-
trative agency's decision not to commence an enforcement pro-
ceeding is unreviewable if it rests squarely on an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and is not governed by "law." Never-
theless, lower courts have consistently deflated the expansive
overtones of the opinion. They have exploited to the utmost
degree all intimations of liberality in Chaney itself, and have
fashioned additional restrictions of their own. The preceding
sections have examined several areas in which Chaney's appar-
ent implications have been overridden. Those areas, however,
merely illustrate a trend; they do not exhaust it. Several other
lower court cases, aggressively applying the concept of partial
unreviewability, have announced their own lists of circum-
stances that overcome the Chaney "presumption of
unreviewability. 446
Indeed, one might question whether Chaney can still be re-
garded as imposing a general presumption against judicial re-
view of agency inaction. If so, the "presumption" does not
appear to be tantamount to a general rule - a principle that
agency refusals to institute proceedings usually are unreview-
able. Rather, it has turned out to be the kind of "presumption"
that only shifts a burden of going forward. That is, Chaney has
come to mean that decisions not to enforce are unreviewable
unless the challenger offers a good reason to allow review; and
the burden shifted does not appear to be a very heavy one.
In a sense, this case study of Chaney's progeny seems to
support the claim that a flexible, interest-balancing approach to
unreviewability will tend to undermine the Supreme Court's
efforts to enforce section 701(a)(2). Yet one cannot attempt to
assess the narrowing thrust of these cases in isolation from the
decision that occasioned them. Although the propensity of
judges to expand their own realm of discretion may partially
446. See, e.g., Chong v. United States Information Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 176
n.4 (3d Cir. 1987) (asserting that allegations of lack of jurisdiction, impermissi-
ble influence, or violation of Constitution, statute, or regulation prevent find-
ing of unreviewability); Dina v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 793 F.2d 473,
476-77 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that § 701(a)(2) would not foreclose allegations of
fraud, excess absence of jurisdiction, or unconstitutionality); Electricities of
N.C., Inc. v. Southeastern Power Admin., 774 F.2d 1262, 1267 (4th Cir. 1985)
(listing factors similar to Chong); Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1547 (7th
Cir. 1985) (claiming reviewal authority when not to do so would "frustrate
Congressional intent").
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explain the trend,447 the fragility of the Chaney opinion proba-
bly was an important factor as well.
A comparison between Chaney and Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,448
another modern effort by the Supreme Court to redirect the
course of judicial review of administrative action, may clarify
this point. In Vermont Yankee, the Court held that courts gen-
erally may not impose procedural requirements on agencies be-
yond those duties contained in the Constitution or relevant
statutes.449 The lower courts have been almost entirely faithful
to this holding.450 Why has Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Ver-
mont Yankee been so much more effective than his opinion in
Chaney? One reason may be that in Vermont Yankee he laid
down a precisely stated holding in a straightforward opinion for
a unanimous Court, backing it up with rhetoric that left little
doubt about the Court's seriousness of purpose.451 The Chaney
opinion, on the other hand, suffered from a confusing analytical
structure, supported by vague and sometimes inconclusive pol-
icy arguments. Moreover, many of these weaknesses were un-
masked in Justice Marshall's careful separate opinion.452 Most
importantly, the Court's opinion displayed a lack of resolve, for
it contained qualifications and reservations that were inconsis-
tent with the basic thrust of the opinion.453 The lower courts
can hardly be blamed for interpreting these mixed signals as a
tacit invitation to use their creativity in exploring the bounda-
ries of the Chaney presumption.454
Furthermore, the results that lower courts have reached in
these cases have, on the whole, been sensible ones. Perhaps the
courts could have recognized the "legal issues" exception to
447. See supra Part H. C.
448. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
449. See id. at 543, 548.
450. See Levin, supra note 291, at 60-61.
451. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 539-49. A cynic could argue,
however, that another reason for Vermont Yankee's apparent success is that
courts can easily control administrative action without resorting to the kind of
procedural oversight Vermont Yankee condemned. In light of the enormous
flexibility of "hard look" review, the argument goes, a court with a strong de-
sire to overturn a given agency action can usually find a substantive ground
for reaching that result.
452. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 840-55 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
453. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
454. See Mikva, The Changing Role of Judicial Review, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
115, 139-40 (1986) (observing, shortly after Chaney, that the Court "may have
created an opening for a range of limitations on administrative discretion").
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Chaney more candidly, or exercised more caution when carving
out an exception for rulemaking cases. In general, however,
these cases have generated a more balanced set of guidelines
for judicial review of agency inaction than a straightforward
reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Chaney would have
provided. In a real sense, the pragmatic approach of the lower
courts has rescued the Supreme Court from the excesses of its
own formalistic analysis.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF UNREVIEWABILITY
Three recent Supreme Court decisions - Chaney, BLE,
and Doe - demonstrate the continuing significance of the
"committed to agency discretion" doctrine. Section 701(a)(2)
seems likely to occupy a prominent place in the administrative
law dialogue of the 1990s: that much can be surmised from the
growing body of scholarship that regards judicial review of
agency action as a very mixed blessing, 455 as well as from the
continuing influence of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia at the Supreme Court.
The law of unreviewability cannot become intellectually
respectable, however, without a major overhaul. Sooner or
later, the Court will have to face up to the flaws in the Overton
Park analysis of unreviewability - its shaky historical founda-
tions, its circularity, and its dubious assumptions about the po-
tential sweep of modem scope-of-review doctrine. In recent
years the Court has been giving the "law to apply" test little
more than lip service, but before long even lip service will cease
to be credible. The "pragmatic approach" advocated in this Ar-
ticle would allow issues arising under section 701(a)(2) to be de-
bated with far greater clarity and candor.
Admittedly, the pragmatic approach has its own limita-
tions. It resists being reduced to an easy-to-apply "test;" in-
deed, it is a largely unstructured mode of reasoning that leaves
room for wide differences of opinion to flourish. As elaborated
above,456 one could reasonably suspect that widespread use of
the pragmatic approach would become troublesome in either of
two complementary ways. It might make judges too willing to
avoid hearing legitimate challenges to agency action; or, con-
versely, it might create too many opportunities for lower court
455. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 2.
456. See supra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
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judges to use interest-balancing arguments to evade Supreme
Court limitations on judicial review.
A principal purpose of the case study in Part IV was to as-
sess whether the lower courts' experience with Chaney's prog-
eny supports either of these apprehensions. At a minimum, the
study strongly rebuts the first potential objection. The courts'
resistance to applying Chaney beyond its facts demonstrates
considerable loyalty to the Abbott Laboratories principle that
section 701(a) should be applied narrowly. The status of that
principle as a cornerstone of the administrative law system will
not be easily dislodged.
By the same token, post-Chaney developments do seem to
indicate that when lower courts perceive the Supreme Court
has left them with room to maneuver, they will tend to move
toward increased review. If the Court is wise, however, it will
not reflexively treat this liberalizing tendency of the lower
courts as insubordination. As the case study illustrates, prag-
matic analysis can provide the flexibility that is necessary if the
Court's sometimes overbroad pronouncements applying section
701(a)(2) are to be trimmed back to proper proportions. Per-
haps this interplay between the Supreme Court and the lower
courts is best seen as a healthy consequence of their respective
roles within our judicial system.45 7 Over time, the Supreme
Court's goal should be to elaborate understandable rules under
section 701(a)(2), but in a way that provides latitude for subse-
quent growth.458
For the immediate future, what is needed is a new genera-
tion of scholarship to guide the development of section
701(a)(2). With appropriate help from the secondary literature,
courts may be able to refine the "committed to agency discre-
tion" doctrine into a body of relatively firm principles that
would match the predictability of the "law to apply" test, but
without the perverse practical consequences of that test. If this
occurs, concerns about the potential misuses of the pragmatic
approach to unreviewability should wane in importance. The
project of developing a workable and normatively appealing
457. Cf Conservative Era, supra note 123, at 395-96 (remarks of Cass Sun-
stein) (discussing creative tension between generalist Supreme Court and spe-
cialist D.C. Circuit).
458. See Mikva, supra note 454, at 140 (suggesting that the Supreme Court
was wise to leave open various escape routes from the Chaney presumption,
because drastic alterations in administrative law doctrine are usually for the
worse).
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common law of unreviewability should be a challenge for
courts, counsel, and scholars alike in the years ahead.

